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ARTICLES 
“NOT IN MY NAME” CLAIMS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT 
ABNER S. GREENE 
ABSTRACT 
We have a constitutional right against the state forcing us to be associated 
with expression with which we do not wish to be associated. The freedom of 
expressive association is not stated in our Constitution’s text. Rather, it is 
derived from various provisions of the First Amendment. As the freedom of 
speech protects, among other things, our right to shape how we present 
ourselves to the world, so does the freedom of expressive association protect us 
from the state shaping us by connecting us to ideas not of our choosing. Our 
freedom of expressive association allows us to claim an idea as our own, and to 
say “that idea is not mine . . . and you may not say it in my name.” This “not in 
my name” conception of constitutional right has iterations in several areas of 
First Amendment law: compelled speech, compelled subsidies for speech, and 
the Establishment Clause. Compelled support for government speech, though, is 
valid, because the state speaks in the name of its citizens. The understanding of 
expressive association as undergirding “not in my name” claims of 
constitutional right allows us to solve two lingering problems of misattribution 
in the compelled subsidies for speech and Establishment Clause case law. But 
whether or not misattribution is present, we maintain a broad presumptive right 
against the state’s advancing ideas in our name. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n1 and Capitol Square Review & 
Advisory Board v. Pinette,2 the United States Supreme Court left open two 
questions regarding misattribution. In Johanns, the federal government imposed 
a targeted assessment on beef producers to pay for generic marketing, 
specifically, the “Beef. It’s What’s for Dinner” advertisements.3 Some of the 
producers objected, raising a claim seemingly permitted after Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education,4 Keller v. State Bar of California,5 and United States v. 
United Foods, Inc.6 In those cases, the Court had held it a violation of the First 
Amendment for the government to compel funding of another’s speech. In 
Johanns, Justice Scalia explained that the Court had not previously considered 
a government speech defense (which was available in United Foods, although 
not in Abood and Keller), and held that there is no First Amendment right against 
compelled exactions for state speech.7 Since the generic beef ads were formally 
those of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), plaintiffs had no First 
Amendment claim.8 The problem, though, was that a reasonable viewer might 
not have appreciated the fact that the ads were those of the U.S. government, 
and might have misattributed them to the beef producers. This was enough for 
Justice Souter to dissent, maintaining that the government speech defense should 
hold only when the governmental source of the speech is transparent.9 Justice 
Scalia admitted that if a reasonable viewer would misattribute the speech to the 
private parties, a First Amendment claim might be available, but wasn’t ready 
to so hold on the record.10 
In Pinette, the State of Ohio allowed some unattended displays in a public 
park surrounding the state capitol in Columbus.11 It refused to allow a KKK-
sponsored Latin cross, on the ground that this would violate the Establishment 
Clause.12 Following a clear line of precedent, the Court stated that rejecting the 
cross would violate the KKK’s free speech rights and that permitting religious 
as well as other private speech in this forum would not violate the Establishment 
 
1 544 U.S. 550 (2005). 
2 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
3 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 554. 
4 431 U.S. 209 (1977). The part of Abood discussed here involved public employee union 
expenditures on ideological speech not related to collective bargaining, to which non-union 
members (who nonetheless had to pay a service fee in lieu of union dues) objected. For more 
on Abood, see infra text accompanying notes 112-42. 
5 496 U.S. 1 (1990). 
6 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
7 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559. 
8 Id. at 560, 562-67. 
9 Id. at 571-72, 578-79 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
10 Id. at 564-66 (majority opinion). 
11 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
12 Id. at 758. 
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Clause.13 There were several concurring and dissenting opinions, and one issue 
discussed was whether it would violate the Establishment Clause if a reasonable 
observer would mistakenly attribute the cross to the State of Ohio. The plurality 
said no, at least where the state has not fostered or encouraged the mistake.14 
The other five Justices, in various ways, said yes.15 
Johanns and Pinette raise related, converse questions: When, if ever, may 
speech that is formally that of the state ground a First Amendment claim in the 
compelled subsidy setting if a reasonable viewer would think it is the speech of 
a private party? When if ever may speech that is formally that of a private party 
ground an Establishment Clause claim if a reasonable viewer would think it is 
the speech of the state? To answer these questions, we need to know more about 
the nature of the claims involved—what is the nature of the right, and the 
claimed harm, in compelled subsidy and Establishment Clause cases of the types 
involved here? Is there a relationship between the two kinds of claims? 
I contend that there is, and that digging more deeply into that relationship 
helps us not only to answer the questions regarding misattribution raised above. 
We can see as well that compelled subsidy and Establishment Clause claims, 
and also compelled speech claims, involve (at times) persons objecting to speech 
being made in their name, or associated with their name. “Not in my name” turns 
out to be an apt way of describing a set of First Amendment claims that are not 
often talked about together, and for which other types of harm are often 
advanced as the justification for protecting the right. “Not in my name” claims 
of constitutional right are, at heart, a type of expressive association problem—
one could describe the right as the freedom of disassociation. My contention that 
there is a familial resemblance among various types of First Amendment claims 
is not meant to reduce such claims to freedom of expressive association. Some 
compelled speech, compelled subsidy, and Establishment Clause claims (even 
just focusing on Establishment Clause claims involving government expression) 
may properly be thought to turn on harm different from the associational harm I 
discuss here.16 Furthermore, some decisions rest upon expressive association 
itself, but are best understood as implicating a different concern about expressive 
 
13 Id. at 760-63. 
14 See id. at 766 (plurality opinion). 
15 See id. at 776-78 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, 
joined by Souter and Breyer, JJ.); id. at 785-86 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment, joined by O’Connor and Breyer, JJ.); id. at 799-812 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
16 In particular, Micah Schwartzman offers an account of the compelled subsidy problem 
that tracks and expands on Jefferson’s concern with freedom of conscience. Micah 
Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 VA. L. REV. 317 (2011). Although we both 
end up rejecting state speech advancing a contested view of religious truth, we get there 
through different paths. At the end of Part IV, I will summarize Schwartzman’s argument and 
explain the differences in our approaches. 
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association than discussed here.17 Thus, my argument can be seen as addressing 
the overlapping center circle of a three-circle Venn diagram (compelled speech, 
compelled subsidies for speech, Establishment Clause), elucidating the nature of 
otherwise disparate First Amendment rights and harms through a conception of 
expressive association that turns on a “not in my name” assertion.18 
In June of 2018, the Court decided three cases involving such claims: public 
sector non-union members who say they have been unconstitutionally compelled 
to pay fees (in lieu of union dues) that support collective-bargaining efforts; anti-
abortion medical and non-medical facilities that deem unconstitutional certain 
state notice and disclosure requirements; and a baker who believes the state 
unconstitutionally compelled him to endorse same-sex marriage by requiring 
 
17 Consider two definitions of “associate”: a corporeal, intransitive sense, “[t]o join in or 
form a league, union, or association,” Associate, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2011) [hereinafter AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY], and 
a mental, transitive sense, “[t]o connect in the mind or imagination,” “[t]o connect or involve 
with a cause, group, or partner,” id. The former sense is at stake in cases pitting laws that 
prohibit certain types of discrimination in places of public accommodation against group 
interests in physically associating with—and developing ideas and messages with—persons 
of their choosing. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Roberts v. U.S. 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). Although I will touch on these cases in Part III, and although 
the Court in Dale intermingled the two types of expressive association concern, these cases 
are not my principal subject. For an argument that rights of corporeal association are better 
viewed through the First Amendment’s right of assembly, see generally JOHN D. INAZU, 
LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY (2012). The latter sense is at 
stake in cases involving compelled subsidies for the expression of others, as well as, I will 
claim, in some compelled speech and Establishment Clause cases. See infra Part I (discussing 
compelled speech cases); infra Part IV (discussing Establishment Clause cases). 
The freedom of association is also front and center in decisions protecting anonymity for 
political speech and group membership. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 
U.S. 334, 342, 357 (1995) (holding that right to distribute anonymous campaign literature is 
protected by First Amendment); Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 
87, 101-02 (1982) (holding that political campaign disclosure requirements were 
unconstitutional as applied to Socialist Workers Party because of history of harassment); 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-66 (1958) (holding unconstitutional, 
on freedom of association grounds, effort to compel NAACP to reveal names of all Alabama 
members and agents). 
18 The Constitution does not explicitly protect any right of association. The Supreme Court 
has interpreted the First Amendment as providing some protection for rights of intimate and 
expressive association. See infra Part III; see also supra note 17 (regarding freedom of 
association and anonymity). A primary goal of this Article is to flesh out how the right of 
expressive association might work when the government associates us with messages with 
which we prefer to remain disassociated. As I was completing edits on this Article, I became 
aware of an argument by William Baude and Eugene Volokh that compelled subsidies for 
expression raise no First Amendment problem, of speech or association. William Baude & 
Eugene Volokh, Compelled Subsidies and the First Amendment, 132 HARV. L. REV. 171 
(2018). I hope to respond to their claim in future work. 
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him to make a wedding cake for a gay couple.19 The Court avoided the 
compelled speech issue in the baker’s case, resolving it instead on fact-specific 
Free Exercise Clause grounds.20 In the other two cases, the claimants prevailed 
on Free Speech Clause grounds.21 These cases will be discussed below.22 Each 
fits with the other cases discussed here; each involves a “not in my name” claim 
of constitutional right, i.e., a type of expressive association claim. 
Understood as a “not in my name” claim, the expressive association right in 
these cases, and the harm from its deprivation, is unusual. It is not a right focused 
on choice—it is not best seen as a right of choosing to do X or not to do X. That 
is how we approach much free speech, and right not to speak, case law.23 You 
have a right to speak, and a right to refrain from speaking. Restriction of either 
is a prima facie violation of the right. The same could be said of compelled 
subsidies—you have a right to support expression with dollars, or not to do so, 
and restriction of either is a prima facie violation of the right.24 This standard 
way of seeing things is not wrong; it is often the best way to see things, or one 
way. But in many of the cases at issue in this Article, there is a different way of 
understanding the right and harm at stake. Perhaps Establishment Clause 
doctrine is closer to recognizing this, because, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, 
which is more commonly seen as a choice right (i.e., to worship or not to 
worship), the Establishment Clause may often best be seen as a structural 
limitation on state action, and in the expressive setting, as a type of citizenship 
rule. After all, the endorsement test, developed for and best suited to state speech 
cases,25 is not about a choice right but about a right to be free of a certain type 
 
19 See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 
(2018); Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
20 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723-24. 
21 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460; Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2378. 
22 For discussion of Masterpiece Cakeshop, see infra note 68. For discussion of Janus, see 
infra note 124. For discussion of Becerra, see infra text accompanying notes 102-09. 
23 For a valuable exploration of constitutional rights that do (and do not) involve choices 
to and not to do something, see generally Joseph Blocher, Rights To and Not To, 100 CALIF. 
L. REV. 761 (2012). 
24 The alleged violation is prima facie, or presumptive, rather than conclusive, in both of 
the preceding textual sentences, because the state may prevail by showing a sufficiently strong 
interest and a close enough means-ends fit. 
25 Justices occasionally use “endorsement” to discuss other types of Establishment Clause 
cases. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 247 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(discussing use of public funds for public school teachers to teach secular remedial courses in 
religious school); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 609, 618-19 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) 
(discussing officially sponsored prayer at public middle and high school graduation 
ceremonies); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(discussing sales tax exemption for religious publications only); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 
38, 59-61 (1985) (discussing minute of silence for meditation or voluntary prayer in public 
school); id. at 67 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). However, I will discuss 
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of denigration or stigma. But even there, the Court has focused more on first- 
versus second-class citizenship concerns—a close relation, one might say, to 
Equal Protection Clause harm—and not on the “not in my name” expressive 
association concern I am developing here. 
At the center circle of the Venn diagram is a right to be free from the state’s 
connecting one with expression that is not one’s own.26 It is a right to avoid 
being tagged with the messages of others. I borrow the phrase “not in my name” 
from everyday politics. For example, when President George W. Bush sent 
troops into Iraq, and dissenters said “not in our name,”27 this had an immediate 
salience. The claim was that such action implicated all Americans, and, the 
dissenters said, improperly so, as they did not authorize it, did not desire it, and 
believed it to be wrongful.28 Some state action connects all citizens (or some 
subset thereof) not to action but to expression, of the state or other citizens, and 
even when we all know what’s going on—when there is no misattribution and 
when we have transparency regarding speaker, funding, and message—the state 
action sometimes unconstitutionally implicates the claimant in the expression. 
Part of the problem is that the expression wasn’t our choice, but the harm is not 
 
“endorsement” in this Article only regarding cases involving religious symbols sponsored in 
whole or in part by the state. 
26 Challenges to compelled speech and compelled subsidies for speech may sometimes 
best be understood as claims for exemption, not for facial invalidation. One could, thus, situate 
at least some of the compelled speech and compelled subsidies for speech cases within the 
larger debate about whether and when exemptions from generally applicable law should be 
ordered by a court or awarded by a legislature. There is a voluminous debate about this issue; 
I have contributed arguments in favor of (prima facie) exemptions for religious claimants, 
Abner S. Greene, Is Religion Special? A Rejoinder to Scott Idleman, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 535 
[hereinafter Greene, Is Religion Special?]; Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the 
Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993) [hereinafter Greene, Political Balance], or for 
claimants more generally who back their positions in a source of normative authority other 
than that of the state, ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF 
AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2012) [hereinafter GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION]. 
On the other side of the debate are, for example, Brian Barry and Richard Arneson, who 
believe that once the state has made a good case for the benefits of a particular law, 
exemptions claims involve a kind of parochial unfair dealing. BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND 
EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF MULTICULTURALISM (2001); Richard J. Arneson, 
Against Freedom of Conscience, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1015, 1018, 1024 (2010). In this 
Article, I am assuming that in the compelled speech and compelled subsidies for speech 
settings the more general case for exemptions is satisfied, and I focus instead on the expressive 
association nature of the claim of right involved in these cases (and on the types of state 
interest that might override the claims of right). Note that the Establishment Clause claims I 
discuss are not claims for exemption but rather facial claims to invalidate state religious 
expression. 
27 See Michael Wilson, Thousands at Central Park Rally Oppose an Iraq War, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 7, 2002, at B3 (noting that the protest was organized by a group called “Not in Our 
Name”). 
28 For my approach to how we should construe such “not in our (or my) name” claims, and 
specifically whether it is proper for citizens to abjure responsibility for the actions of 
government officials, see infra text accompanying notes 138-55. 
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only the deprivation of agency. In addition, and perhaps foremost, it is the 
unwanted connection. I construct my self—both subjectively and in my 
presentation to others—in part through expression, through what is said and 
what is left unsaid. Compelled association with messages risks cheapening or 
muddying that expressive presentation, distorting the messages or views with 
which I want to be connected by expanding them or contradicting them with 
other messages. This distortion may occur when the state interferes with our 
actively disseminating messages (such as in the St. Patrick’s Day parade in 
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bi-Sexual Group of Boston, Inc.),29 
but it may also occur more persistently and pervasively by interfering with how 
we construct and present our identities in less active or focused ways.30 The harm 
is broad but weak—it can easily occur, as we’ll see throughout this Article with 
the various types of state action that cause it, but it need not be deep or profound. 
Since the harm can exist without misattribution, the distortion need not be that 
others misperceive what I stand for, but rather that they see me in a web of 
messages or ideas that include compelled ones, that have to be seen as such and 
bracketed. And it can exist without going to conscience—my displeasure with 
the connection need not be because of a concern about the moral wrong of the 
idea involved. “Broad but weak,” therefore, seems the right way to describe the 
harm of unwanted association with a message or idea. This will allow us to track 
the various ways the harm occurs and to accept the various ways in which state 
interests are strong enough to trump or outweigh the prima facie harm. 
To appreciate the way in which I am claiming unwanted expressive 
association is a broad yet weak harm in our constitutional order, let’s consider 
the relationship between endorsement, attribution, and association. Endorsement 
is a strong connection. To endorse, in the sense relevant here, is “[t]o express 
approval of or give support to, especially by public statement.”31 A compelled 
connection cannot be an endorsement. Misattribution could lead to a mistaken 
impression of an endorsement, but misattribution aside, in none of the compelled 
speech or compelled subsidization of speech cases discussed in this Article is it 
appropriate to say the subject is endorsing the message. Attribution is the 
trickiest term of the three. To attribute, in the sense relevant here, is “[t]o regard 
(a work, for example) as belonging to or produced by a specified agent.”32 This 
is close to endorsement, and thus a strong sense of association, but we might 
attribute a “work” (say, a painting) to someone without that person engaging in 
the kind of knowing claim that endorsement involves. The same is true for a 
message—if you are a member of a group with knowledge of that group’s ends, 
and you may leave the group but choose to stay, it is appropriate to attribute the 
group’s message to you, even if we wouldn’t say you have endorsed the 
message. Association is at the opposite end of the spectrum of connection from 
 
29 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
30 Thanks to Amy Sepinwall for helping with this formulation of the idea. 
31 Endorse, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 17. 
32 Attribute, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 17. 
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endorsement. We may associate someone with a message for all sorts of reasons, 
from endorsement (strong association) to a state motto stamped on someone’s 
license plate (not an endorsement, yet maybe more than mere association 
because of the use of the personal property, but even attribution seems too strong 
here) to the use of one’s compelled tax or fee to pay for a message that one has 
not chosen (a fairly weak, but real, associative connection, I will argue)33 to 
 
33 Amy Sepinwall and Nomi Stolzenberg have advanced views of complicity, in the setting 
of compelled money for actions that one deems immoral, that have some affinity with my 
view of associative harm in the message-sending setting. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience 
and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for Religious Exemptions in Hobby Lobby’s Wake, 82 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1897, 1908 (2015); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, It’s About Money: The 
Fundamental Contradiction of Hobby Lobby, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 727, 742-44 (2015). 
Sepinwall maintains that “we should treat complicity claims with great deference: I hope to 
show that we are, in many cases, without the moral clarity or authority to challenge someone’s 
belief that the conduct legally required of him would make him complicit in what he perceives 
as a wrong.” Sepinwall, supra, at 1908. She adds that “one can bear responsibility for 
another’s act independent of whether one took part in the decision to pursue that act.” Id. at 
1916. Furthermore, she argues that “we should treat first person assessments of complicity 
with solicitude—at least presumptively.” Id. at 1958. Although Sepinwall concludes that 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), was correctly decided—a conclusion 
with which I disagree, see infra note 38—her theory of complicity can be characterized as 
broad yet weak: the former because it focuses on the claimant’s view of harm from compelled 
connection to conduct deemed immoral, a view that can be idiosyncratic and not in accordance 
with standard views of proximity; the latter because later in the article, Sepinwall advances 
ways that we should account for harm to third parties before granting conscientious objection 
claimants exemptions from generally applicable law. See Sepinwall, supra, at 1959-79. 
Stolzenberg also advances a capacious view of when the law should accept claims of 
complicity in down-the-line harm from compelled financial exactions. She writes that “courts 
must be prepared to recognize the existence of the same burden in every case where an act of 
payment is involved (be it the payment of taxes, wages, benefits, or donations) that enters into 
the circulatory system through which money that will pay for ‘sinful’ services flows.” 
Stolzenberg, supra, at 735-36. In other words, from the point of view of those claiming harm 
from compelled subsidies: 
Any act of payment, be it a charitable donation, the payment of wages, benefits, or taxes 
or a payment to purchase goods, is an act of transferring money qua material value into 
the hand of a recipient (who may or may not use it in ways deemed immoral or sinful). 
And that is just what financial facilitation is. 
Id. at 744. Unlike Sepinwall, Stolzenberg pivots from this broad view of complicity to an 
argument opposing the result in Hobby Lobby. See infra note 38. 
The threshold view of complicity advanced by both scholars—of how our compelled 
dollars might facilitate what we believe to be harm—is analogous to my point that we might 
deem harmful via mere association any message/idea with which the state connects us through 
compelled speech or subsidy. 
For a lucid and scholarly treatment of complicity, but focused on intentional participation 
in joint or group activity (even absent but-for causation of harm or control over outcome), see 
CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 113-45 (2000). 
Similar to my account of the harm from compelled expressive association, Kutz’s theory of 
accountability is “broad but thin.” Id. at 144. 
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membership in a polity34 that speaks for all of us (also a fairly weak, but real, 
associative connection, as I will expand on below).35 
The “not in my name” approach can help us see how compelled speech and 
compelled subsidies of others’ speech may be presumptively problematic.36 In 
earlier work, I questioned the part of Abood that invalidated state action, that 
held unconstitutional compulsory fees in lieu of union dues when such fees went 
to ideological speech of the public employees’ union.37 My concern was that 
there was no compelled speech involved, that misattribution was unlikely, and 
that therefore the grounding of the claim was unclear. To the extent it was 
properly seen as an associational harm (which I questioned), how would we be 
able to distinguish compelled taxation when used for government speech? Now, 
however, I see another approach. It is indeed presumptively unconstitutional for 
the state to compel me to fund the expression of others.38 Such expression is, at 
 
34 Such membership is best seen as involuntary; you were born here without a say in the 
matter. That you have not left doesn’t make your membership voluntary enough to render 
your connection to state speech anything more than weakly associative. See GREENE, AGAINST 
OBLIGATION, supra note 26, at 39. 
35 See infra text accompanying notes 138-55. 
36 Part of my discussion of how a “not in my name” characterization grounds a 
presumptive right against compelled speech or subsidy of others’ speech will be to critique 
Robert Post’s thinner view of these rights. See infra text accompanying notes 156-71. 
37 Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12-18 (2000). 
38 Although in this Article I am focusing on compelled association with messages or ideas, 
claimants sometimes argue that the state has compelled them to contribute to immoral or 
otherwise improper ends, but not in an expressive way. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 
S. Ct. 2751 (2014), is an important recent example of this. The Court held that the federal 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) required an exemption for a small for-profit 
corporation from federal law requiring contribution to group health insurance for its 
employees, because the corporation claimed that the insurance could be used to produce 
abortions, against the religious beliefs of the corporate owners. See id. at 2785. The claim 
was, in other words, that the federally mandated insurance payments would render the 
corporation complicit in the down-the-line harm of abortion. There are many issues involved 
in this controversial case, among them whether such a company should have had standing to 
assert a RFRA claim, whether it suffered the statutorily required “substantial burden” on its 
religious exercise, and whether if it did, the state interest in requiring compliance was 
compelling. I have argued that the plaintiffs did not suffer the statutorily required “substantial 
burden.” Abner S. Greene, A Secular Test for a Secular Statute, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 
34; Abner S. Greene, Religious Freedom and (Other) Civil Liberties: Is There a Middle 
Ground?, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 161 (2015) [hereinafter Greene, Religious Freedom]. This 
position is not inconsistent with my willingness to accept a broad (but weak) view of 
complicity regarding the harm from compelled expressive association—as the name implies, 
“substantial burden” is a statutory threshold that requires showing something substantially 
more than a mere “burden.” As I have argued, there are reasons of the proximate cause variety 
suggesting that the Hobby Lobby plaintiffs did not suffer such a burden. See id. at 185-90. 
Nomi Stolzenberg agrees that Hobby Lobby was incorrectly decided, but for different reasons. 
See Stolzenberg, supra note 33. She says we should accept the plaintiffs’ claim of substantial 
burden, id. at 731, 733, 744, but then yield to the government’s “general interest in being able 
to determine how public funds will be spent and how the revenue to support that spending 
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least in part, in my name, and my freedom of expressive association should 
extend (presumptively) to resisting expression being made in my name by 
government compulsion. We can then see the ways in which this presumptive 
right may be overcome by state interests—either in government speech generally 
(as Johanns properly held, without much analysis),39 but not in state religious 
speech (as a few cases hold); 40 or in promoting nonideological common interests 
(such as avoiding free-riding in a system of exclusive bargaining/fair 
representation, as in Abood; 41 providing legal services to the poor, as in Keller;42 
or when generic advertising is germane to a larger collective economic interest, 
as in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc.).43 As I will develop below, the 
presumptive right is overcome when the compelled subsidy funds state speech 
because the individual may not make the “not in my name” claim—the state 
properly speaks in the name of its citizens (as a matter of constitutional law, 
even as some resist sometimes as a matter of policy).44 By contrast, we should 
understand the Establishment Clause as an exception to this rule—state religious 
speech is not properly in the name of the citizens, and thus when the state 
engages in such speech we may understand Establishment Clause harm as an 
instance of harm to the freedom of expressive association. 
After discussing the expressive association/not-in-my-name approach to 
compelled speech in Part I, compelled subsidies in Part II, and the Establishment 
Clause in Part IV (as well as the few cases that turn on the right of expressive 
association itself in Part III), this Article will return in Part V to the animating 
problem of whether and when misattribution as to speaker identity may ground 
a constitutional claim. A “not in my name” grounding for a First Amendment 
claim does not require a showing of misattribution, and often the claimed harm 
will be broader but weaker, turning on undesired association with expression not 
of my choosing. Misattribution as to speaker identity, in the Johanns and Pinette 
settings, also implicates a harm of the expressive association/not-in-my-name 
sort, but narrower and deeper than when misattribution does not exist. If a 
reasonable observer would erroneously think the government’s ads are mine, 
 
will be collected,” id. at 733. Amy Sepinwall, on the other hand, pushes the broad view of 
complicity to the conclusion of accepting the Hobby Lobby plaintiffs’ claim of substantial 
burden and requiring the exemption from insurance payments. See Sepinwall, supra note 33, 
at 1977-79. 
39 See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005). 
40 See infra text accompanying notes 184-86. 
41 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). Janus v. American Federation of 
State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), overruled this 
part of Abood, deeming the state interest insufficient to overcome any hit to the expressive 
association interest. I agree with Justice Kagan that Janus was not only wrongly decided but 
also poorly reasoned. See infra note 124. 
42 Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990). 
43 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997). 
44 See infra text accompanying notes 138-55 (discussing state speech in name of all 
citizens). 
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then to that observer the expression is being made in my name (and my 
expressive association right is violated). If a reasonable observer would 
erroneously think a private party’s religious speech is the state’s, then to that 
observer the expression is being made in all of our names (and the expressive 
association right of the Establishment Clause variety is violated). If I have a right 
not to foster another’s expression against my will, even when everyone knows 
who is compelling whom and who is in fact speaking, then I have a similar right 
when being improperly tagged with the expression’s content. 
I. COMPELLED SPEECH 
The Court has interpreted the First Amendment as offering robust protection 
for a right not to speak, as well as for the right to speak. There are some 
exceptions to this strong protection for compelled speech, however. First, I will 
sort through the case law, then I will explore the justifications or groundings for 
the generally strong protection. I will argue that we can see the protection as 
grounded in a right of expressive association of the “not in my name” variety. 
Some of the other groundings for a right against compelled speech work only 
some of the time, but the one I will defend works in all of the cases. 
The key cases invalidating state action as unconstitutionally compelling 
speech are West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,45 Wooley v. 
Maynard,46 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,47 Pacific Gas & Electric 
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,48 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, 
and Bi-Sexual Group of Boston, Inc., and National Institute of Family & Life 
Advocates v. Becerra.49 In Barnette, the Court considered a state requirement 
that school children recite the pledge of allegiance in public schools.50 The State 
had expelled some Jehovah’s Witnesses children for failing to say the pledge, 
had threatened to send some such children to reformatories for juvenile 
delinquents, and had prosecuted and threatened to prosecute some parents.51 The 
Court invalidated the requirement, referring generally several times to the First 
Amendment.52 This is the only one of the six cases that involved speech-as-
utterance. 
 
45 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
46 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
47 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
48 475 U.S. 1 (1986). 
49 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
50 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 629. 
51 See id. at 630. 
52 Id. at 634, 639, 641-42. The decision did not forbid public schools from asking children 
to recite the pledge, just from requiring its recitation. In other words, so long as students may 
opt out, that is satisfactory. See supra note 26. But see Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of 
Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451 (1995) (questioning sufficiency of an opt-out 
after Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)). 
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In Wooley, the Court confronted New Hampshire’s insistence that 
noncommercial motor vehicles registered in the state bear license plates 
containing the state motto, “Live Free or Die.”53 In response to claimed injury 
from a Jehovah’s Witnesses couple, the Court invalidated the requirement under 
the First Amendment.54 The Court referred to a “right to refrain from speaking 
at all,”55 a “right . . . to refuse to foster . . . an idea they find morally 
objectionable,”56 and a “right to avoid becoming the courier for such message.”57 
In Tornillo, the Court invalidated a right of reply, or compelled access/must 
carry statute, which provided that “if a candidate for nomination or election is 
assailed regarding his personal character or official record by any newspaper, 
the candidate has the right to demand that the newspaper print, free of cost to the 
candidate, any reply the candidate may make to the newspaper’s charges.”58 The 
Court held that the law violated the First Amendment’s free press guarantee 
because it would affect editorial decisions ex ante (some newspapers might not 
critique a candidate for fear they would have to run a reply) and ex post (the 
effect of the law is to alter newspaper content).59 
In Pacific Gas, the question was “whether the California Public Utilities 
Commission may require a privately owned utility company to include in its 
billing envelopes speech of a third party with which the utility disagrees.”60 A 
plurality of the Court deemed the case similar to Tornillo61—the requirement 
affected the company’s speech ex ante (deterring it from engaging in speech that 
would trigger the right of reply)62 and ex post (affecting the company’s editorial 
control of what goes into the billing envelopes).63 The plurality held that the 
requirement violated the First Amendment, “because it forces appellant to 
associate with the views of other speakers, and because it selects the other 
speakers on the basis of their viewpoints.”64 
 
53 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 706-07 (1977). 
54 As with Barnette, Wooley does not forbid the general practice—here, the State’s placing 
the motto on license plates. Rather, it requires an opt-out for objecting motor vehicle owners. 
For the Maynards, the holding provided a defense to their covering up the motto. See supra 
note 26. 
55 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714. 
56 Id. at 715. 
57 Id. at 717. 
58 Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 244 (1974). 
59 Id. at 256-58. 
60 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
61 Id. at 9-11. 
62 See id. at 14. 
63 See id. at 14-15. 
64 Id. at 20-21. Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment, for reasons substantially 
similar to those of the plurality, although he took care to note that he did not deem corporate 
speech rights coextensive with individuals’ speech rights. Id. at 25-26 (Marshall, J. concurring 
in the judgment). 
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In Hurley, the private sponsors of the annual St. Patrick’s Day parade in 
Boston wanted to exclude a gay, lesbian, and bisexual Irish-American group 
from marching in the parade with a banner proclaiming its identity.65 
Massachusetts state courts determined that state public accommodations anti-
discrimination law applied, and barred the exclusion.66 The Court unanimously 
held that this application of state law “violates the fundamental rule of protection 
under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the 
content of his own message.”67 
Last Term, in Becerra, the Court added a sixth68 compelled speech 
invalidation to the list when it held as likely unconstitutional, in the context of a 
 
65 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bi-Sexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 
561 (1995). 
66 Id. at 561-66. 
67 Id. at 573. 
68 The Court had another opportunity to develop its compelled speech doctrine last Term 
in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018), 
in which Colorado’s generally applicable public accommodations anti-discrimination law—
including protection for sexual orientation—ran up against a baker’s religiously based 
objection to making a cake for a same-sex couple’s marriage celebration. At first blush, one 
might think that the baker was primarily concerned about compelled complicity in what he 
believes to be sinful, and thus that he was raising a Free Exercise Clause exemptions claim. 
However, under Employment Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (1990), that claim would fail because the state can show a rational basis for 
insisting on uniform application of the public accommodations law. Because of this doctrinal 
impediment, the baker litigated the case primarily on compelled speech grounds. But the 
Court deemed the free speech claim “difficult,” Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723, 
and did not resolve it. Instead, it held that the state civil rights commission exhibited hostility 
toward the baker’s religious faith, and accordingly, on this narrow free exercise ground 
(narrow as opposed to reconsidering Smith), reversed the commission’s order that had 
required the baker to comply with the law. Id. at 1723-24, 1729, 1732 
Resolving the baker’s compelled speech claim would indeed have been difficult, for several 
reasons. First, the state action is not specific to expression, as it was in Barnette, Wooley, 
Tornillo, Pacific Gas, and Becerra, but is rather a law of general applicability. That was true 
too in Hurley, though, so there’s some precedent for the baker’s claim. Second, for the Free 
Speech Clause to be triggered at all, the claimant has to believe he is engaged in expression 
(met here) and the reasonable observer has to see the act in question as expressing a message 
or idea (less clear here—this depends on whether the average wedding guest appreciates that 
some kind of expressive artistry has gone into the making of the wedding cake and that some 
kind of message or idea is being conveyed thereby). See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 
(1989). The baker may present a prima facie expressive association claim of the compelled 
speech variety—by demanding that he make the cake for the couple in question, the state 
(arguably) compels him to be associated with a message with which he does not wish to be 
associated. That leaves the question whether the state interest in providing an open, 
nondiscriminatory market for goods and services, plus the state interest in protecting gay 
persons from the dignity harm of exclusion from such market, should trump the expressive 
association claim. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion says some powerful things about the 
equal rights of gay persons in the marketplace, see Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727-
29, but does not resolve the compelled speech question. In a concurrence in part and in the 
judgment joined by Justice Gorsuch, Justice Thomas concluded that the state violated the 
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motion for a preliminary injunction, two provisions of a California law imposing 
notice requirements “on facilities that provide pregnancy-related services.”69 
The first provision applies to “licensed covered facilit[ies],”70 which “must have 
the ‘primary purpose’ of ‘providing family planning or pregnancy-related 
services,’” and which satisfy at least two of six requirements in terms of services 
provided.71 The notice, which “must be posted in the waiting room, printed and 
distributed to all clients, or provided digitally at check-in,” states: “California 
has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access to 
comprehensive family planning services (including all FDA-approved methods 
of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women. To determine 
whether you qualify, contact the county social services office at [insert the 
telephone number].”72 The Court held that this licensed notice requirement alters 
speech content, requiring petitioners “to inform women how they can obtain 
state-subsidized abortions—at the same time petitioners try to dissuade women 
from choosing that option.”73 Even under intermediate scrutiny,74 the State could 
not justify the law either as a regulation of professional conduct that only 
incidentally burdens speech or as a required disclosure of purely factual and 
uncontroversial information.75 Instead, the law “regulates speech as speech”76 
and requires disclosure of information about an abortion option, which is 
“anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic.”77 California may engage in 
government speech to inform women about the abortion option, but it “cannot 
co-opt the licensed facilities to deliver its message for it.”78 
The second statutory provision in Becerra applies to “unlicensed covered 
facilit[ies],”79 which have “the ‘primary purpose’ of ‘providing pregnancy-
related services,’” do “not have a licensed medical provider on staff or under 
contract,” and satisfy at least two of four requirements, which include offering 
 
baker’s free speech rights (as a prima facie matter) and that strict scrutiny should apply, but 
because the state court had not addressed who would prevail under strict scrutiny, Justice 
Thomas stepped back from doing so “in the first instance.” Id. at 1746 (Thomas, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Gorsuch, J.). In a dissent joined by Justice 
Sotomayor, Justice Ginsburg rejected the compelled speech claim. Id. at 1748 n.1 (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting, joined by Sotomayor, J.). For more on Masterpiece Cakeshop, see Abner S. 
Greene, Barnette and Masterpiece Cakeshop: Some Unanswered Questions, 13 FIU L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019). 
69 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368 (2018). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 2369. 
72 Id. (alteration in original).  
73 Id. at 2371. 
74 Id. at 2375. 
75 Id. at 2372-74. 
76 Id. at 2374. 
77 Id. at 2372. 
78 Id. at 2376. 
79 Id. at 2369. 
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“obstetric ultrasounds, obstetric sonograms, or prenatal care to pregnant 
women” and offering “pregnancy testing or pregnancy diagnosis.”80 The notice, 
which must be prominently displayed on site and in advertising materials, states: 
“[T]his facility is not licensed as a medical facility by the State of California and 
has no licensed medical provider who provides or directly supervises the 
provision of services.”81 The Court held that the State had yet to provide a 
sufficient justification for this unlicensed notice requirement and that the 
provision “unduly burdens protected speech,” in part because of the requirement 
that the notice be prominently displayed. 82 
The Court has upheld compelled speech/access rules in three types of setting. 
The first is where the state is compelling private property to function as a type 
of public forum for various views (and accordingly where there is little risk of 
misattribution and where it is easy enough for the property owner to issue 
appropriate disclaimers).83 The second is where the federal government is 
compelling over-the-air television broadcasters or cable television companies to 
carry some content they might not otherwise carry (because of the monopolistic 
aspect of these industries, the government’s regulatory licensing role, and thus 
the quasi-public nature of the media).84 The third is where the government is 
compelling disclosure of consumer-protecting information that is meant to 
prevent deception or at least that is purely factual and uncontroversial.85 I will 
return to some of these cases when exploring the grounds for the right against 
compelled speech as developed in the first six cases. 
Although there are various ways of unpacking the grounds for the invalidation 
holdings,86 I will suggest six: the first four appear in some but not all of the 
 
80 Id. at 2370. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 2377. 
83 See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). Note, though, a few things 
about disclaimers. First, in the cases I discuss in this Article, it is inappropriate for the state 
to insist on disclaimers to cure constitutional harms. See infra note 100. Second, we shouldn’t 
assume that someone’s failure to disclaim connection to compelled speech means the person 
endorses the message. Maybe she just wants to remain silent. The flip-side is true, too—after 
being given an opt-out right (such as in Wooley), a person’s failure to opt out doesn’t mean 
she endorses the message in question (there, “Live Free or Die”). For suggestions that we 
should make more of failure to disclaim or failure to opt out, see PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 99 
(Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (highlighting failure to disclaim), and 
Laurence H. Tribe, Disentangling Symmetries: Speech, Association, Parenthood, 28 PEPP. L. 
REV. 641, 644 (2001) (highlighting failure to opt out). 
84 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
85 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985). The Court 
mentioned both grounds in the opinion and has not since clarified whether either alone 
suffices to uphold a compelled disclosure rule. 
86 See Nat Stern, The Subordinate Status of Negative Speech Rights, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 847, 
900 (2011) (“With Barnette’s lone holding subject to such varied construction, it is not 
surprising that the larger body of cases touching negative speech rights has resisted coherent 
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holdings; the fifth appears sometimes in the Court’s rhetoric, and is a gateway 
to a sixth ground, which, I will argue, justifies all the holdings. 
One ground for deeming compelled speech unconstitutional is misattribution. 
If the state required me to speak, or carry another’s speech, in a way that would 
mislead a reasonable person into thinking I was endorsing the message, that 
would seem the true converse case to the standard free speech violation.87 Just 
as I have the freedom to express messages I believe, so should I have the freedom 
not to endorse—or be perceived as endorsing—messages I do not believe. But 
only one of the key six cases even arguably turns on this. In most settings the 
reasonable observer should appreciate that the compelled message is just that: 
compelled—or the observer at least shouldn’t assume that the speaker/platform 
is endorsing the message. In Barnette, are schoolchildren in the classroom really 
thinking “oh gosh, Jimmy or Jenny is so patriotic!”? They all know, at some 
level, that this is a ritual, enforced from above. In Wooley, it seems unlikely that 
people think drivers with New Hampshire “Live Free or Die” plates are 
endorsing that message. We understand that drivers must display state-issued 
license plates, and that the state slaps its motto on such plates. In Tornillo and 
Pacific Gas, the compelled messages are antithetical to the host’s speech—that 
is why the messages were compelled—so it is hard to see the reasonable 
observer mistaking them for the newspaper’s or utility’s own expression.88 I am 
assuming that the licensed notice in Becerra could include a reference to the 
California Code number that compels it, significantly reducing the chance of 
misattribution. A disclaimer would also be easy in this setting; the point of my 
suggesting it is not to overcome the ultimate claim of constitutional right, but to 
suggest a way to ameliorate misattribution risk.89 Hurley is the one case of the 
six in which misattribution might be part of the problem, and the only case of 
the six in which the Court discussed it as a ground for invalidation: 
Although each parade unit generally identifies itself, each is understood to 
contribute something to a common theme, and accordingly there is no 
customary practice whereby private sponsors disavow “any identity of 
viewpoint” between themselves and the selected participants. Practice 
follows practicability here, for such disclaimers would be quite curious in 
a moving parade. Without deciding on the precise significance of the 
 
exposition.”); see also Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147, 147 
(2006) (“[F]iguring out just when governmentally compelled speech is problematic requires 
understanding how those compelled to speak are harmed by being so compelled. And that 
turns out not to be such an easy task.”). 
87 The misattribution issue in Johanns and Pinette is different from the one here. See infra 
Section V.A. 
88 In a footnote in Pacific Gas, in commenting on the possibility that the utility could 
enclose a disclaimer, the plurality said that “[t]he disclaimer serves only to avoid giving 
readers the mistaken impression that TURN’s words are really those of appellant.” Pac. Gas 
& Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 15 n.11 (1986) (plurality opinion). But the 
grounding for the holding was not concern about such mistake. 
89 For more on disclaimers, see supra note 83 and infra note 100. 
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likelihood of misattribution, it nonetheless becomes clear that in the 
context of an expressive parade, as with a protest march, the parade’s 
overall message is distilled from the individual presentations along the 
way, and each unit’s expression is perceived by spectators as part of the 
whole.90 
A second possible ground for a right against compelled speech is control over 
one’s body. In Barnette, the state was forcing the schoolchildren to say 
something—to use their bodies against (possibly) their will.91 Perhaps there is a 
(presumptive, and often dispositive) right against state interference with our 
bodies—consider the abortion rights cases, the contraceptive rights cases, and a 
case involving unconsented stomach-pumping.92 Barnette, but not the other five 
cases on our list, would fit here. 
Seana Shiffrin has suggested a third possible set of grounds for a rule against 
compelled speech—concerns about belief alteration and insincerity.93 These are 
not identical grounds, and Shiffrin states them separately. I am grouping them 
here, for they seem strongest in the utterance setting, that is, Barnette and other 
similar compulsion. Perhaps it is the case that when we are forced to say the 
same thing over and over again, the repetition might lead us to believe it. And 
perhaps even though we and others know we are acting under compulsion, the 
mere fact of saying something we do not sincerely believe contributes to a 
culture and/or habit of insincerity. These are important arguments, but they do 
not hold nearly as well, if at all, in non-utterance settings. 
 
90 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bi-Sexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 
576-77 (1995) (citation omitted). For a discussion of misattribution in the compelled speech 
cases, see Abner S. Greene, (Mis)Attribution, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 833, 839-44 (2010). 
91 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626-30 (1943). 
92 See Greene, supra note 52, at 481-82 (discussing these cases). Steve Shiffrin casts this 
concern as an assault on human dignity, and says it might be present in Barnette and Wooley. 
Steven H. Shiffrin, What Is Wrong with Compelled Speech?, 29 J.L. & POL. 499, 506 (2014). 
He adds, “At a minimum, the compelled speech doctrine in cases like these prohibits actions 
of government that force individuals to be couriers of messages to which they are 
ideologically opposed.” Id. As I set forth below in discussing the “anti-fostering” rationale, 
the “couriers” argument captures a problem in all of the compelled speech cases. The assault 
on human dignity rationale, though, is narrower, and perhaps should be limited to settings 
such as that in Barnette. Forcing one to say words is arguably an assault on human dignity; 
that language seems too strong for conditioning driving a car on using a state-issued license 
plate with an objectionable motto. I am willing to concede some added insult from the 
connection of the motto with one’s motor vehicle, but it seems a different order of magnitude 
from being compelled to actually speak, and we should reserve personhood/dignity language 
for more corporeal insults. This would still be true even if one hypothesized a more 
objectionable state motto—the concern would still be best cashed out as an objection to being 
a courier for the state’s message, that is, an expressive association/not-in-my-name concern, 
as developed below. 
93 See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 
NW. U. L. REV. 839, 854 (2005); see also SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON 
LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 94-97 (2014). 
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Fourth, one concern in Tornillo and Pacific Gas is that specific speech content 
triggers the right of reply, thus perhaps improperly deterring the speakers (the 
newspaper or the utility) from saying what they want to say in the first place.94 
This problem is not present in the other cases, and it’s not clear whether this is 
a ground for the compelled speech holdings or just another way of describing 
the problem in certain settings. 
Fifth, there is a broader anti-fostering concern, perhaps present in all the 
cases, that gets us closer to the expressive association/not in my name approach 
for which I will ultimately argue. This is perhaps best seen in the Wooley 
holding. Even if everyone knows (or should know) that the car owner is not 
endorsing “Live Free or Die,” even if there is no injury to personhood/dignity as 
with utterances, even if driving around with that motto is not likely to alter one’s 
beliefs or contribute to insincerity, and even if this is not a case of speech-
content-triggering-right of reply, we can still say that the state is compelling one 
to help it advertise or foster its message.95 We can see all six of the invalidation 
holdings through an anti-fostering lens—in each setting, the government is 
compelling the regulated person or company not just to support the speech in 
question but also to utter it or carry/host it physically. Perhaps we can ground 
the invalidations in a free speech theory that, at least presumptively, grants one 
the liberty to use one’s body or property (broadly conceived, to cover not only 
Barnette but also the car in Wooley, the newspaper in Tornillo, the billing 
envelope in Pacific Gas, the parade in Hurley, and the family planning centers 
in Becerra) to foster or disseminate one’s chosen messages and not those of 
others.96 
 
94 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 14 (1986) (plurality 
opinion); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974). 
95 That’s true with government speech, as well; our funds are helping the government 
foster its message, with which one doesn’t always agree. As we learn from Johanns, see infra 
text accompanying notes 138-55, we have no general First Amendment right not to contribute 
to state speech. I have two points here. First, as I will explain more in Part II, it is best to think 
of all compelled subsidies for the speech of another as presumptively needing justification; in 
the government speech setting, we have such justification. Second, in Wooley, because the 
individual motorist is compelled to carry the state’s message on his or her car, it’s best to see 
the case as compelled speech, rather than compelled subsidy. Here’s one way to think about 
this: The harm to the Maynards is the same whether or not they are paying tax dollars that 
support the state speech in question (here, the motto on each state-issued license plate). The 
harm is from their being forced to carry another’s message (here, the state’s) on their property, 
and that is best seen not as subsidizing the state’s speech, but as speaking it in the sense of 
displaying it. 
96 For a mostly similar approach, see Tribe, supra note 83, at 645 (“The right that all of 
these cases affirm is better understood as a right not to be used or commandeered to do the 
state’s ideological bidding by having to mouth, convey, embody, or sponsor a message, 
especially the state’s message, with one’s voice or body or resources, on one’s personal 
possessions, through the composition of the associations one joins or forms, or in their 
selection of teachers, exemplars, and leaders”); id. at 647 (stating one has a “right not to be 
used as a vehicle for speech”). 
  
1494 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:1475 
 
Although the core six decisions finding a compelled speech violation can be 
grounded in a right not to foster another’s message (even the state’s, through 
one’s body or property), the anti-fostering rationale could use further 
justificatory grounding. What is it about being compelled to foster another’s 
message that is harmful, if we put aside misattribution, bodily integrity, belief 
alteration/sincerity, and the deterrent effect of specific speech content triggering 
specific rights of reply? I suggest that we may see anti-fostering through a 
freedom of expressive association lens. Compelling me to speak or host 
another’s speech compels me to associate with—or perhaps be associated 
with—such speech. This is so even if no one is mistaking the message as mine. 
The speech is still being made, in part, in my name. I might want no speech made 
in my name, or speech only of my choosing. Connecting or associating me with 
unwanted messages is a harm to my ability to construct my self in part through 
my expressive acts. It affects both how the world sees me and how I see myself. 
So there is a relationship here to misattribution theory and to Seana Shiffrin’s 
belief alteration argument, but my expressive association argument is different. 
The connection to both is the concern that my expression is being muddled. But 
the “not in my name” grounding holds even if it is clear that the expression is 
being made or hosted under compulsion, and even if there is no or little risk that 
the speaking or hosting of speech will alter my beliefs. 
The six cases barely mention this type of grounding.97 In Pacific Gas, the 
plurality noted that “[t]he Commission’s access order also impermissibly 
requires appellant to associate with speech with which appellant may 
disagree.”98 And here is that case’s final statement of the holding: “We conclude 
that the Commission’s order impermissibly burdens appellant’s First 
Amendment rights because it forces appellant to associate with the views of 
other speakers, and because it selects the other speakers on the basis of their 
viewpoints.”99 Part of the association concern, though, was that if the utility did 
not respond to the message forced into its billing envelope, people might 
mistakenly think it was the utility’s message, and thus the utility was effectively 
compelled to speak to disclaim that association.100 I’m not sure the reasonable 
 
97 In my first article on compelled speech, I did not discuss this expressive association/not-
in-my-name theory. See Greene, supra note 52. The principal doctrinal difference between 
my conclusions there and here is my greater willingness now to accept Wooley as correctly 
decided. See id. at 483 (describing Wooley as the “most clearly wrong” of the compelled 
speech and compelled subsidies for speech cases). 
98 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 15; see also id. at 18. 
99 Id. at 20-21. 
100 See id. at 18. It is insufficient for the state to compel speech—or compel a subsidy 
supporting speech—and attempt to overcome the presumptive constitutional harm by saying 
the private speaker can disclaim connection to the message. That forces the speaker to speak 
when she might choose to remain silent. See Greene, supra note 90, at 837, 844, 850; see also 
supra note 83. Note also that things are different when it comes to the Establishment Clause, 
where it is not improper to demand that the state (or a private party acting with state approval) 
disclaim religious speech when it is providing an opportunity for private speech and speaker 
  
2018] “NOT IN MY NAME” CLAIMS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 1495 
 
person would see the public interest group’s billing envelope insert as the 
utility’s—it was clearly marked as the public interest group’s speech, and clearly 
opposed to some of the utility’s positions. Moreover, the expressive association 
argument holds even absent this misattribution/effectively-forcing-disclaimer 
concern. 
In a footnote in Wooley, the Court wrote: 
It has been suggested that today’s holding will be read as sanctioning the 
obliteration of the national motto, “In God We Trust” from United States 
coins and currency. That question is not before us today but we note that 
currency, which is passed from hand to hand, differs in significant respects 
from an automobile, which is readily associated with its operator. Currency 
is generally carried in a purse or pocket and need not be displayed to the 
public. The bearer of currency is thus not required to publicly advertise the 
national motto.101 
“Readily associated with its operator” could be thought to imply a point about 
misattribution, which is wrong in the Wooley setting. But it could be another 
way of making the anti-fostering point that the majority opinion emphasizes. 
Before closing this discussion of compelled speech and turning to compelled 
subsidies for speech, it’s worth spending some time on the Court’s latest 
compelled speech invalidation, Becerra, which presents a difficult problem 
regarding when a “not in my name” claim should prevail over a state argument 
that it is compelling the provision of consumer-protecting information. Anti-
abortion advocates maintained that the state is unconstitutionally requiring them 
to provide notice of a state-provided abortion option.102 Although the existence 
of such an option is purely factual, and is in some sense uncontroversial (as a 
pure fact), in the setting of the highly controversial abortion debate the law 
requires someone advocating one method of exercising a right (“carry the fetus 
to term”) to provide information about another method of exercising that right 
(“here is how to locate an abortion provider”). Take a few other examples of 
where this might be problematic. First, assume optometrists offer service X and 
oppose service Y, while ophthalmologists offer service Y and oppose service X. 
Assume both X and Y are legal options. Now assume that the state requires 
optometrists offering service X also to post a notice about the availability of 
service Y, and vice versa for ophthalmologists. Assume that the difference of 
 
identity might become confusing. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 
U.S. 753, 782-83 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(noting importance of possible disclaimer); id. at 784 (Souter, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (same); id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (recognizing 
absence of disclaimer as important); Abner S. Greene, The Concept of the Speech Platform: 
Walker v. Texas Division, 68 ALA. L. REV. 337, 371-72 (2016) (arguing that the state should 
or must issue appropriate disclaimers in certain settings). 
101 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 n.15 (1977). 
102 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368-69 (2018). 
The Court’s invalidation of the unlicensed notice provision seems overly persnickety to me, 
even at a preliminary stage of litigation, and I won’t address it further. 
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opinion cuts to the core of how these different medical providers believe good 
vision is properly attained. Whatever justification there might be for the state to 
use its own speech to make people aware of both options (or even to push for 
one option over another), what is the rationale behind the law in question here? 
Even if the state deems it good for people to know their legal options, the means 
to that end under this hypothetical law require the service providers to engage in 
expression that fosters ideas with which they disagree. For a second example, 
assume a law requiring all pre-K-12 schools to post notices about the availability 
of other school options. Now assume there is a private school whose founders 
and administration strongly believe the public schools are failing children or 
even, perhaps, that the government shouldn’t be in the business of educating 
children. My hypothetical notice law requires the private school to foster the 
government’s message regarding the gamut of educational options, and in so 
doing interferes with the private school’s strongly held ideological beliefs. 
In so arguing, I agree with the part of Justice Breyer’s Becerra dissent103 that 
suggests the holding is in some tension with the part of Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey104 that upheld a compelled speech 
requirement in the abortion setting.105 As Breyer notes:  
That law required the doctor to tell the woman about the nature of the 
abortion procedure, the health risks of abortion and of childbirth, the 
“probable gestational age of the unborn child,” and the availability of 
printed materials describing the fetus, medical assistance for childbirth, 
potential child support, and the agencies that would provide adoption 
services (or other alternatives to abortion).106  
Casey upheld this requirement as an informed-consent provision, part of the 
regulation of healthcare, and thus as a legitimate, merely incidental, regulation 
of expression.107 Breyer cogently argues that if the state may “tell a woman 
seeking an abortion about adoption services,” it should be permitted to “require 
a medical counselor to tell a woman seeking prenatal care or other reproductive 
healthcare about childbirth and abortion services[.]”108 But the answer should 
 
103 Id. at 2384-86 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
104 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
105 Id. at 883. 
106 Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2384 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 881). 
107 Id. at 2384-85; see also id. at 2373 (majority opinion). 
108 Id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In discussing the tension between the majority’s 
holding regarding the licensed notice provision in Becerra and the compelled speech holding 
in Casey, Justice Breyer also discusses compelled speech provisions that the Court had struck 
down prior to Casey. Id. at 2383-84. In Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. 
(Akron I), 462 U.S. 416, 442-49 (1983), and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 758-71 (1986), the Court invalidated statutory provisions 
that required doctors to inform women seeking abortions about alternatives to that rights 
choice (as well as, in Akron I, information better understood as of the standard informed 
consent variety). Breyer notes that in Casey, the Court wrote: 
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not be to uphold the licensed notice in Becerra. Rather, the answer should be the 
majority’s holding on licensed notice in Becerra, combined with a revision of 
the Casey compelled speech holding, to invalidate the portion of the compelled 
speech that goes beyond informed consent about the abortion procedure and 
extends to providing information about alternatives. The state may use its own 
speech powers to provide notice of a diversity of options regarding the exercise 
of a right (or even to push for one of those options), but the Constitution does 
not permit it to require a private party to advertise rights alternatives with which 
the private party disagrees. 
The difficulty with this argument is that when the state compels speech of the 
public health and safety variety, either to prevent deception or to provide purely 
factual and uncontroversial information, sometimes the compelled speaker 
(often a business that has to post a notice) objects, deeming the matter 
controversial. Courts have to draw lines between when the required notice is 
sufficiently nonideological and uncontroversial, and sufficiently backed by 
widely accepted science, to overcome the objections of those compelled to 
speak. Despite the difficulty in drawing this line, in some instances we should 
see the notice requirements as not sufficiently based on widely accepted science, 
 
To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a constitutional violation when the 
government requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information 
about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and 
the ‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus, those cases go too far, are inconsistent with 
Roe’s acknowledgment of an important interest in potential life, and are overruled. 
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2384 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 882). One has to be careful when 
interpreting this passage. The words “[t]o the extent” suggest that there might be aspects of 
the Akron I and Thornburgh compelled speech holdings that survive Casey. The way to 
synchronize Akron I, Thornburgh, and Casey, and to make sense of Becerra, is to distinguish 
mere informed consent about the medical procedure being sought—constitutional even if 
compelled speech—from the state unconstitutionally using a private actor to advertise rights-
choice alternatives that the actor wishes not to advertise, promote, or foster. 
Note that the Court in Akron I and Thornburgh was concerned not so much about compelled 
speech regarding available rights-choice alternatives, but more narrowly about the state 
compelling speech to persuade women not to have abortions. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 
762; Akron I, 462 U.S. at 444. The latter should be deemed unconstitutional under any 
plausible not-in-my-name/expressive association theory. My argument here is more 
expansive, also deeming unconstitutional the state’s compelling a private actor to advertise a 
diversity of rights-choice alternatives when the matter at hand is controversial/ideological and 
the compelled speaker’s view is that some of the alternatives are improper, wrong, or sinful. 
Note finally this passage from Casey: 
[W]e depart from the holdings of Akron I and Thornburgh to the extent that we permit a 
State to further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of the unborn by enacting 
legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, even when in so 
doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion. 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 883. On the argument I am presenting here, the state may express a 
preference for childbirth over abortion via state speech generally, but not through compelling 
the speech of a private party, even a doctor under the guise of simply regulating the practice 
of medicine. But see id. at 884. 
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and instead as going to matters of ideological social contest. I have argued in 
previous work that the state may take positions on controversial as well as 
uncontroversial matters.109 But the state should not be permitted to compel 
private actors to push the state’s, or anyone else’s, view on 
controversial/ideological matters. 
II. COMPELLED SUBSIDIES FOR SPEECH 
When the state takes money from us for the speech of others, it presumptively 
violates a constitutional right. But of what sort?110 And how may this 
presumption be overcome? In this Part, I will first make the case for a 
presumptive violation, sounding in the right of expressive association, 
understood as a “not in my name” harm. Next, I will explain how the 
presumption is overcome in three different settings, including (most 
importantly) compelled funding for government speech. Finally, I will describe 
and rebut Robert Post’s thinner view of how the Constitution is implicated in 
compelled subsidies for speech cases (with reference to his parallel view 
regarding compelled speech cases and the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment more generally).111 
Let’s start with the generative case in this line, Abood, in which the Court 
considered an agency shop arrangement between the city of Detroit and the 
public school teachers’ union.112 Teachers who did not join the union were 
required to pay fees in lieu of union dues.113 The union used some of the funds 
for collective-bargaining activities over wages, benefits, and working 
conditions, and spent some of the funds on ideological speech, for political 
candidates or political views.114 The Court stated this general proposition: “To 
compel employees financially to support their collective-bargaining 
 
109 Abner S. Greene, Government Endorsement: A Reply to Nelson Tebbe’s Government 
Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 87 (2013); Greene, supra note 37, at 7-26; 
Abner S. Greene, Government Speech on Unsettled Issues, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1667 (2001); 
Abner S. Greene, State Speech and Political Liberalism, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 421 (2013). 
110 For a concern about finding proper grounding for these cases, see Gregory Klass, The 
Very Idea of a First Amendment Right Against Compelled Subsidization, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1087, 1116 (2005) (arguing that paying a mandatory fee “has too little moral content,” 
and that compelled subsidization of speech “does not interfere with freedom of belief,” 
because there is “semantic gulf between the act of paying and the speech it helps fund”). Klass 
ultimately backs a conception of the right that would apply strongly in a somewhat narrow set 
of cases: “The compelled subsidization of the speech of others violates the First Amendment 
only when the funds collected are used to promote the message of an identifiable viewpoint 
or interest in debate on a controversial political issue.” Id. at 1130 (emphasis omitted). As will 
be clear from my discussion below, the associational/not-in-my-name approach applies to a 
broader set of cases, although more weakly than Klass’s approach. 
111 See infra notes 156-71 and accompanying text. 
112 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
113 See id. at 212. 
114 See id. at 212-13. 
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representative has an impact upon their First Amendment interests. An employee 
may very well have ideological objections to a wide variety of activities 
undertaken by the union in its role as exclusive representative.”115 Borrowing 
from earlier private-sector labor cases, the Court concluded that the state interest 
in having one authorized representative engage in collective bargaining on 
behalf of all employees (union members and not) trumped any First Amendment 
interest.116 Justice Powell penned a stinging opinion on this point, focusing on 
the fact that in the public-sector setting, most (if not all) issues can be seen as 
implicating ideology and not merely the pocketbook.117 He saw the interest in 
having an exclusive bargaining representative and free-rider concerns if non-
union members do not have to pay fees as insufficient to trump the First 
Amendment interests in free speech and association.118 In Janus, the Court 
overruled this part of Abood, vindicating Powell’s dissent.119 
As to the ideological union speech not part of the collective-bargaining 
process argument, Abood unanimously came out the other way: 
Our decisions establish with unmistakable clarity that the freedom of an 
individual to associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and ideas is 
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. . . . The appellants 
argue that they fall within the protection of these cases because they have 
been prohibited, not from actively associating, but rather from refusing to 
associate. They specifically argue that they may constitutionally prevent 
the Union’s spending a part of their required service fees to contribute to 
political candidates and to express political views unrelated to its duties as 
exclusive bargaining representative. We have concluded that this argument 
is a meritorious one.120 
That the state was compelling funds rather than speech itself (via utterance or 
displaying/hosting) made no difference to the Court. My treatment of Abood 
throughout the rest of this Article is to this part of the holding (except for a few 
footnote discussions of Janus). 
Although Abood mentions the freedom of (expressive) association, the 
opinion does not dig deeply into how compelled subsidies infringe that 
freedom.121 These are not instances of corporeal association, where (say) the 
 
115 Id. at 222. 
116 Id. at 222-23, 227-32. 
117 See id. at 257-58 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
118 See id. at 255, 259-64. 
119 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
The Court had been heading in this direction. See Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. 
Ct. 1083, 1083 (2016) (appellate court ruling following collective-bargaining part of Abood 
affirmed by an equally divided Court); Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014); Knox v. Serv. 
Emps., 567 U.S. 298 (2012). 
120 Abood, 431 U.S. at 233-34 (citations omitted). 
121 Id. Janus relies in part on the freedom of expressive association. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. 
at 2463, 2466, 2468. In Johanns, Justice Scalia offered a few possible groundings for the right 
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state compels a group to admit members or permit leaders it would prefer to 
refuse. And there is no sense in the Abood opinions that the problem is 
misattribution—that a reasonable observer would trace the union speech in 
question to all funders of such speech and thereby assume all funders share the 
union’s views. The best grounding for the associational argument in Abood is an 
anti-fostering, “not in my name” concern. The state was compelling the non-
union members to help foster and promote union speech; the non-union 
members either had specific objections to the speech in question or simply did 
not want to support the speech (it makes no difference doctrinally which is the 
case). The not-in-my-name associational concern is either that the non-union 
member does not wish others to associate her name with the speech (even if 
others are under no illusion that she supports it) or that she objects to being 
compelled to seeing herself as associated with the speech, or both. She wants to 
chart her own expressive path, either by supporting causes with which she 
agrees, or by remaining silent, or a combination of the two. Even if others do not 
mistakenly believe she is endorsing the supported messages, there is a distorting, 
a cheapening, of what she does choose to support. So there is some connection 
between this way of putting the Abood problem and Seana Shiffrin’s concern 
that compelled speech can be productive of insincerity. But the concern about 
cheapening the messages one does support through compelling association with 
other messages can exist even without the deeper or more profound harm of 
rendering our expression insincere. Furthermore, one might see the harm as one 
of complicity with the funded message, even without a sense that the complicity 
has violated moral norms. The complicity entailed in connecting my money to 
your message is a special sort of complicity; we can capture the nature of the 
harm by saying that the compelled funders object to speech being made in their 
name.122 
The right of expressive association in the compelled subsidies for speech 
setting is not absolute, and may be trumped by sufficiently strong state interests. 
I will discuss how the cases have cashed this out (again by going beyond the 
 
at issue in Abood. He wrote, “The reasoning of these compelled-speech cases has been carried 
over to certain instances in which individuals are compelled not to speak, but to subsidize a 
private message with which they disagree.” Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 
557 (2005). And he maintained, “being forced to fund someone else’s private speech 
unconnected to any legitimate government purpose violates personal autonomy.” Id. at 565 
n.8. Regarding his first point, as we have seen above, the reasoning of the compelled speech 
cases is varied, with different concerns animating the different holdings. See supra notes 86-
101 and accompanying text. The common thread among the compelled speech cases, and 
Abood, is a right of expressive association understood in “not in my name” terms. Regarding 
Justice Scalia’s second point, “personal autonomy” is too capacious an idea to capture what 
is going on in the compelled subsidy cases; our constitutional order does not recognize 
personal autonomy per se as presumptively protected. Perhaps a version or aspect of personal 
autonomy is in play in compelled subsidy cases, but then we have to figure out the version or 
aspect in question. 
122 For more on the connection of complicity with the expressive association arguments 
advanced here, see supra notes 33 and 38 and infra text accompanying notes 242-43. 
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Court’s limited statements). Then, I will describe and respond to Robert Post’s 
different way of examining the material.123 
Three types of state interest may justify overriding the expressive association 
right implicated by compelled subsidies for speech: when the funded speech is 
germane to a nonideological state goal (or otherwise advances a strong enough 
state interest to outweigh the harm to the associational right), when the funded 
speech is best understood as a public forum for speakers of various ideologies, 
and when the subsidy is funding state rather than private speech. 
Regarding the first category: This is the justification for Abood’s upholding 
the compelled fees from non-union members for collective-bargaining activity. 
Wages, benefits, and working conditions are in the common interest of all 
represented members of the agency shop, and the speech of the funded union 
(the exclusive bargaining representative) is germane to those common ends. 
Janus overruled this part of Abood, discounting the distinctive nature of the 
exclusive bargaining model and the free-riding concerns from allowing non-
union members to be represented by the elected union, without paying anything 
 
123 See infra notes 156-71 and accompanying text. 
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for it.124 Keller reached a bifurcated result similar to that in Abood.125 California 
requires attorneys admitted to practice to join and pay dues to the state bar 
 
124 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2466-69. Public sector collective bargaining necessarily involves 
matters of public concern, where various workers in the same unit, represented by the 
designated union, may differ on various issues. Abood recognized this, but held that the state 
interest in securing a stable labor-management bargaining relationship outweighed any First 
Amendment harm. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 217-32. Janus flips that conclusion, holding that 
the agency fee requirement, even for collective bargaining, “violates the free speech rights of 
nonmembers by compelling them to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public 
concern.” Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460. In the core doctrinal section of his majority opinion, 
Justice Alito refers to the First Amendment generally, to free speech, and to the freedom of 
expressive association. Id. at 2463-65. 
I agree there is a prima facie First Amendment violation with even the collective-bargaining 
portion of public employee agency fee arrangements, but believe the state interest sufficient 
to outweigh the First Amendment harm. That there is a prima facie violation fits with my 
general argument in this Article—even if freedom of speech is not exactly what is at stake 
here (there is no misattribution, non-union members may dissent all they want, and the state 
is not forcing them to say anything or host any message), there is still a presumptive violation 
of the right of expressive association. This is because the arrangement associates the non-
union members with the positions taken by the union, in the broad and weak sense that 
compelled subsidies make fee payers complicit in the positions taken by fee recipients. Some 
of the positions the union is advancing in public-sector collective bargaining are on contested 
ideological matters, and the union is advancing them in the name of all represented 
employees, union members and non-union members alike. 
Janus gives short shrift, however, to the key argument backing the agency fee arrangement 
for collective bargaining. The law makes the elected union the exclusive bargaining 
representative for all unit employees, union members and non-union members alike. In that 
capacity, the union must represent all employees fairly, equally, without discriminating 
between members and non-members. To permit non-union members the benefits of such 
representation without having to pay anything permits a classic form of free-riding, shifts the 
financial burden to the union members, and risks drying up sources of funds for the elected 
union. So long as the system of exclusive bargaining/fair representation is in place, the state 
interest in ensuring a fairly balanced funding stream is strong. Justice Kagan makes this case 
well in her dissent, id. at 2488-91 (Kagan, J., dissenting), and Justice Alito’s response 
downplays the core virtues of the exclusive bargaining model and the free-rider concerns, id. 
at 2466-69 (majority opinion). (Indeed, the Janus majority seems unhappy about the premise 
of exclusive bargaining. See id. at 2478 (deeming the exclusive bargaining model a 
“significant impingement on associational freedoms that would not be tolerated in other 
contexts”). Perhaps this libertarian concern (what else might we call it?) undergirds the First 
Amendment analysis.) We should see the countervailing harm to a non-union member’s First 
Amendment rights as real but fairly weak. It is not as strong as in the compelled speech setting, 
where one is forced to say, display, or host a message. It is best seen as a hit to the freedom 
of expressive association, but of the weakest sort, not like the Roberts/Dale setting (which 
involves admitting unwanted members to a group) or the Hurley setting (which involves 
admitting a banner display contrary to the affected party’s beliefs). Rather, it requires us to 
trace an associative connection through money, from compelled payer to speaker. The “not in 
my name” claim is still present, but we should see it as outweighed by the agency shop system 
of exclusive and fair bargaining representation. 
125 Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1990). 
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association.126 As in Abood, the Court required an opt-out for dissenting 
members regarding the portion of their dues that goes to ideological activity.127 
But the Court permitted dues to go to regulation of the legal profession and 
provision of legal services.128 Even though such activities involve expression, 
they are seen as a nonideological end.129 Finally, in Glickman, the Court upheld 
compelled assessments levied on producers of tree fruits (nectarines, peaches, 
and plums) as part of a collective marketing arrangement; the money was used 
for, inter alia, generic advertising to which plaintiffs objected.130 After Johanns, 
which I will discuss soon, Glickman can be understood as a government speech 
case (the USDA was running the program), but bracketing that, it can also be 
understood as a case involving a presumptive right of expressive association 
trumped by a state interest in ensuring a robust industry sector (here, tree fruit 
production and sales). 
Regarding the second category: The University of Wisconsin requires 
students to pay fees to support various student activities; some of the funds 
support ideological expression of student groups.131 In Board of Regents v. 
Southworth,132 the Court upheld the program, distinguishing Abood and Keller: 
in those cases the compelled money was subsidizing (in part) the ideological 
speech of one entity; here the compelled funds are subsidizing a wide array of 
expression, not benefiting any particular viewpoint(s).133 The Court held that the 
proper analogy is to the public forum (and designated public forum) cases.134 
Although the issue in those cases is denial of access and here it is compelled 
subsidies, the state here is opening a kind of forum for speech (through funds), 
and neither the state (in the public forum setting) nor the student funders of 
speech (here) should be deemed connected to or associated with any particular 
message. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins135 is the most important 
analogous case. The Court upheld a state constitutional requirement that private 
shopping center owners permit speech activity of various groups, even if the 
owners object to some of the messages or would prefer not to host expressive 
activities at all.136 The Court saw the requirement as opening a kind of (private) 
public forum, where the likelihood of misattribution is low,137 and (I add, as a 
gloss) any “not in my name” claim is attenuated by the multitude of expression 
 
126 See id. at 4-5. 
127 Id. at 16-17. 
128 Id. at 15-16. 
129 I assume this bifurcated Keller holding survives Janus, but we will see. 
130 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 467-77 (1997). 
131 Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 222 (2000). 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 230-34. 
134 Id. at 229-31. 
135 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
136 Id. at 74-75. 
137 Id. at 87. 
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being ushered in by the state mandate. Similarly, in Southworth, the objecting 
students might have a presumptive claim not to fund speech with which they 
disagree, but because their money is funding many student groups, the 
connection of any student to any message, either in the minds of others or in the 
minds of objecting students, is weak, overridden by the state interest in providing 
seed money for all manner of expression. 
Regarding the third category: In Johanns, the Court held that there is no 
constitutional right blocking compelled subsidies for government speech.138 The 
Court confronted its third case of a targeted subsidy for a specific food 
industry—here, beef producers.139 Here is the core of the Johanns holding: 
“Compelled support of government”—even those programs of government 
one does not approve—is of course perfectly constitutional, as every 
taxpayer must attest. And some government programs involve, or entirely 
consist of, advocating a position. . . . We have generally assumed, though 
not yet squarely held, that compelled funding of government speech does 
not alone raise First Amendment concerns.140  
The Court proceeded to so hold.141 But there’s not much reasoning in Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion. Here’s the way I suggest we should see it: Any 
compelled subsidy for expression presumptively violates one’s expressive 
associational rights, of the not-in-my-name variety. But when the funded 
expression is that of the state, the rights claim vanishes, because government 
speech is properly deemed to be in one’s name, that is, in the name of the citizens 
who fund the speech and whom the government represents.142 Viewing the 
 
138 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 557-67 (2005). 
139 In United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001), involving mushrooms, the 
Court distinguished Glickman by holding that when generic advertising alone is at stake, 
without the connection to a broader collective marketing scheme, the expressive association 
right of dissenting producers is violated. The Court could have come out the other way by 
understanding that the program, and the ads, were that of the federal government, but it did 
not reach the government speech argument because it had not been raised below. See id. at 
416-17. 
140 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559 (citation omitted). 
141 See id. at 560, 562. One slightly odd thing about Johanns is that there is no canonical 
statement of this sort: “there is no First Amendment right to challenge funds exacted for 
government speech.” But there is no other way to understand Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion. 
142 Although he rejects the presumptive invalidity of compelled subsidies for expression, 
see infra text accompanying notes 156-71, Robert Post offers some support for my conclusion 
here. See Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech 
and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 555, 581 n.124 (2006). 
This connection of citizen with state speech is consistent with my treatment, in earlier 
writing, of the various ways First Amendment doctrine recognizes a disconnect between actor 
and message when conditions of generality and intervening act are present. See Greene, 
Religious Freedom, supra note 38, at 185-90. Thus, in the line of cases involving a state-
created forum for speech, we don’t attribute resulting private religious speech to the state, 
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Abood right through a “not in my name” lens sets up the distinction Johanns 
later draws. 
The argument that the state speaks for its citizens follows from how we 
understand the state to have legitimacy in a republican form of democratic 
governance. By legitimacy I do not mean to refer to the justifiability of the 
state’s demanding our obedience to law.143 Here, I refer to legitimacy in the 
representational sense—at least in the United States, and in similar nations, our 
elected and appointed legislative, executive, and judicial representatives and 
officers hold office for us, as properly elected by us or appointed by those we 
elect. Thus we have the commonplace (and correct) understanding that citizens 
are sovereign authors and that government office-holders are agents. The harder 
question is whether we can say that citizen-authors are accountable or 
responsible for the actions of office-holder agents. For purposes of this Article, 
the question is about the expressive acts of such agents. The issue is not whether 
citizens could be held liable for monetary or equitable relief, but rather whether 
it is appropriate to blame citizens for state speech and whether it is appropriate 
for citizens to regret in a self-critical way state speech with which they disagree. 
For example, assume the Environmental Protection Agency issues an official 
document denying a human role in climate change. That is the official statement 
 
because the forum allows many to speak on various issues, and thus the attribution is to those 
private speakers only. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). In a few compelled 
speech and compelled subsidy cases, see supra text accompanying notes 83, 131-37, we allow 
the state to compel one to host or fund what is essentially a forum for many speakers. Again, 
because of the wide variety of resulting speech from other actors, we see a disconnect from, 
and thus no attribution to, the compelled party. And in some cases raising Establishment 
Clause challenges to state funding, the Court upholds programs largely because they are 
general (they don’t fund religious recipients only) and because individuals make the decisions 
regarding where to spend the money. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 
(2002) (upholding, on these grounds of generality and private choice, state-funded vouchers 
program used substantially for private religious schools). One might argue, based on these 
lines of case law, that we should similarly see citizens as disconnected from state speech, 
because there is so much of it, on so many topics, and because government office-holders, 
and not the citizens, are disseminating the messages. This misses the main point that follows 
in the text, however: as a conceptual matter of republican form of government, at least in the 
U.S. system, there is no disconnect of this sort, but rather we properly see governmental agents 
as speaking for the authorizing citizens as a general, wholesale matter. 
In the alternative, if one were not inclined to accept my argument that the state speaks in 
the name of its citizens, one could use the fact that taxpayer dollars are funding a wide array 
of state expressive activities to help break the link between funder and speech and thus weaken 
the expressive association rights claim. If, in the setting of compelled funding for private 
speech this public forum analogue is enough to overcome the expressive association claim, 
see Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229-31, then this argument could work as well in the setting of 
compelled funding for state speech. This is so, though, if (and only if) one first rejects my 
primary argument, holding citizens responsible for the expression of their governmental 
agents. 
143 I will say more below on that issue, and on the connected question of whether we have 
a moral duty to obey the state’s law (the question of political obligation). 
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on the matter of the executive branch of the federal government. My claim is 
that it would be, therefore, also the official statement on the matter of the citizens 
of the United States, as citizens. If one of us were then to say “Not in my name!,” 
that should be understood to mean “you have spoken for me in your role as my 
agent, I regret the statement and think it wrong, and I am expressing displeasure 
in part because this statement is now associated with me as principal/author.” It 
should not be understood to mean “this is wrong and I disagree with it and never 
would have authorized it—therefore it can’t properly be said to be in my name.” 
One agency cost of a republican form of government is that there will be periods 
of time (perhaps long ones) during which our authorized agents will be acting 
for us in ways with which we disagree.144 But, at such times, they still are acting 
for us and in our name. The connection of a citizen to the expression of her 
agents is broad and weak, similarly to how the expressive association harms 
discussed throughout this Article are broad and (possibly) weak (i.e., not 
necessarily deep and profound)—broad in that it can arise in various settings, in 
various ways; weak in that if we appreciate the agency costs aspect of the state 
speaking for its citizens, the connection of any state message to the citizens will 
properly be understood as attenuated, as not true endorsement, but rather as 
association of message with citizen-as-authorizing-principal. 
In his book, In Our Name, Eric Beerbohm offers a rich account of the 
responsibilities of citizens in a democratic state.145 Throughout, he seeks a 
middle ground between a merely associative account, which he says would lead 
to too much citizen responsibility for state action, and an account that would 
render us responsible for a narrow set of intentional joint actions only. For 
Beerbohm, citizens are responsible for state action to the extent of their “role 
and causal impact.”146 He adds, “to say that a state acts unjustly in my name is 
to make a claim about my individual moral responsibility. It is to say something 
meaningful about my causal contribution to the state’s action.”147 Mere 
membership in the polity/association with the state as a citizen is insufficient for 
citizens to be responsible for state action.148 My view about citizen obligation is 
in many ways similar, though cashed out in the debate about the moral duty to 
obey the law (more about that in a moment). If we are focused, though, on 
whether citizens properly bear some responsibility for the expressive acts of 
their governmental agents, I argue that a conceptual account of the agency 
relationship in a republican form of government properly links citizen to state 
message. Beerbohm is in part concerned about the harms the state can cause with 
 
144 See ERIC BEERBOHM, IN OUR NAME: THE ETHICS OF DEMOCRACY 193-94, 200-01 
(2012) (discussing the continuous authority and responsibility that citizens have regarding 
acts of their governmental agents). 
145 Id. at 1-24. 
146 Id. at 282. 
147 Id. at 281. 
148 Id. at 63, 226, 279-80. 
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action rather than with expression,149 and wants a strong sense of citizen 
responsibility but not from our mere membership in the polity as citizens. His 
account of democratic complicity is this: “x is liable for causally contributing 
[and it is clear this is meant to extend beyond but-for causation] y to political 
injustice through democratic role z.”150 But our causal footprints are unequal; 
“[o]ur relation to injustice as citizens can range from coprincipals to active and 
then passive accessories.”151 Perhaps my view of citizen responsibility for state 
speech can be synched with Beerbohm’s variegated, contribution-specific view, 
if one accepts the claim that mere citizenship is sufficient for holding the 
authorizing citizen-principals accountable for state messaging. We could still 
require more than mere membership/association to hold citizens accountable for 
harms from not merely expressive state action, as Beerbohm wants to do. 
To close out this discussion of the state speaking for its citizens, I need to 
distinguish the arguments about political obligation and legitimacy made in my 
book Against Obligation.152 There, I maintained that we don’t have a general 
moral duty to obey the law (the political obligation issue), that the sources of 
authority to which some adhere are multiple, and that the state should therefore 
accommodate such sources (often, but not necessarily, religious).153 I argued as 
well that if we view “political legitimacy” as requiring the state to justify 
generally its claims that we all obey the law all of the time (at least as a prima 
facie matter), then the state lacks such legitimacy, correlatively to there being 
no general moral duty to obey the law.154 These arguments might suggest I 
would take a more skeptical view of citizen connection to state expression. But, 
consistent with Beerbohm’s helpful approach that sees citizen accountability as 
variegated, my positions are consistent. To demand that we all obey the law all 
of the time (even merely presumptively) is a significant demand, conflicting at 
times with other norms that we hold dear and impinging in serious ways on what 
we may and may not do. To say we are accountable for state expression is also 
demanding, but less so. Conceptually, I am adopting a type of associative 
obligation account for citizen responsibility for state speech, although I reject an 
associative obligation account backing a moral duty to obey the law.155 These 
two positions make sense if one views the nature of the citizen’s association with 
 
149 Id. at 63, 226-51. 
150 Id. at 240. 
151 Id. at 242. 
152 GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 26. 
153 Id. at 135-60. 
154 Id. at 24-34. 
155 Id. at 63-94. In rejecting the associative obligation argument for political obligation, I 
suggested that when citizens use “we” as in “we are at war,” they are not necessarily jointly 
committed to that end and indeed often “keep a wary eye out for assertions of state power that 
misunderstand our nation’s heritage or that claim shared goals.” Id. at 89. I was not at that 
point discussing whether the state should be understood conceptually to be speaking for the 
citizens. My claim here is that it should be, and that citizen critiques of state speech are best 
understood as concerns about what the agent is saying in the name of the principal. 
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the state as authorizing governmental officials to speak in the citizen’s name, 
but not as necessarily placing demands of obedience on the citizen. 
 
 
 
In several articles, Robert Post has challenged the view that compelled speech 
and compelled subsidies for speech presumptively trigger First Amendment 
scrutiny.156 Referring to his free speech theory writings, Post maintains that 
“First Amendment concerns are not automatically activated whenever 
expression is restricted,” but only when “communication is regulated in a 
manner that implicates specific First Amendment values,” most importantly, 
“democratic self-governance and participation in the construction of public 
opinion.”157 The same is true, argues Post, for compelled speech. Thus, 
according to Post, compulsory jury service, compelled testimony, reporting 
requirements, securities disclosures, and labeling requirements are examples of 
state action that do not trigger First Amendment scrutiny merely by compelling 
speech (or by compelling activities that might include compelling speech).158 
The same is true, he contends, for compelled subsidies for speech.159 Similarly, 
Post maintains that “only those associations dedicated to the kind of speech that 
is protected by the First Amendment can come within the umbrella of the First 
Amendment right of association.”160 
 
156 See Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867 (2015) 
[hereinafter Post, Compelled Commercial Speech]; Post, supra note 142; Robert Post, 
Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, 2005 SUP. 
CT. REV. 195 [hereinafter Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech]; Kathleen M. Sullivan & 
Robert C. Post, It’s What’s for Lunch: Nectarines, Mushrooms, and Beef—The First 
Amendment and Compelled Commercial Speech, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 359 (2007) (reporting 
here on Post’s contributions alone). 
157 Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech, supra note 156, at 213; see also Post, 
Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 156, at 873. 
158 See Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech, supra note 156, at 213; see also Post, 
Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 156, at 913; Sullivan & Post, supra note 156, at 
369. 
159 See Post, supra note 142, at 575. 
160 Sullivan & Post, supra note 156, at 375. For a related argument about the narrowness 
of First Amendment coverage, see Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 
2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 86 n.27; Frederick Schauer, Out of Range: On Patently Uncovered 
Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 346, 347-49 (2015) [hereinafter Schauer, Out of Range]; 
id. at 347 n.6 (citing Schauer’s prior writings on this subject). Schauer says that “[s]peech and 
communication are at the center of contract law, for example, but it is laughable to suppose 
that all, most, or even much of contract law in any way implicates the First Amendment.” 
Schauer, Out of Range, supra, at 347. We must initially demarcate the jurisdictional boundary, 
as it were, of any rule, before getting into how to apply it. The First Amendment, says Schauer, 
is no different. Id. at 348. The gist of my response to Post’s similar argument is that when we 
claim, for example, that the First Amendment has nothing to do with possible regulatory 
matters involving contract language, we obscure the preliminary work we’re doing in ruling 
contract law out of bounds from First Amendment coverage. The better way of seeing it is 
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There is a better way to see this, both normatively and descriptively. We will 
always have to balance the value of the individual expression right or interest 
(which may include the value of expression to society as a whole, but may not) 
against the state’s reasons for regulating. Sometimes the doctrine does this fairly 
openly. For example, the familiar categories in which speech may (sometimes) 
be regulated based on content involve a kind of categorical balancing of value 
versus harm. The resulting doctrinal tests represent the cashing out of the 
balance. We see this with Brandenburg v. Ohio161 (incitement), Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire162 (fighting words), Miller v. California163 (obscenity), New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan164 and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.165 (libel), and 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission166 
(commercial speech). We engage in such balancing as well when the 
government regulates based on content outside of the categories; then courts 
engage in a kind of ad hoc strict scrutiny (very tough, but not impossible, for the 
state to win).167 And we balance in cases involving content-neutral regulation, 
whether the regulation of speech is “incidental” to the regulation of conduct 
 
that there are always/usually sufficient state interests to trump any free speech claim regarding 
contracts. My critique of Schauer here is similar to my critique of his theory of “literal” or 
“plain” meaning in statutory interpretation. See Abner S. Greene, The Work of Knowledge, 72 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1479, 1484-92 (1997). 
Some scholars and Justices are increasingly concerned about the “Lochnerizing” or 
“weaponizing” of the First Amendment to achieve what we might call libertarian or anti-
regulatory ends. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 
S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of “weaponizing” First 
Amendment); Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2380-83 
(2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (warning that majority’s approach in using First Amendment 
in Lochner-like fashion to strike down regulation “threatens considerable litigation over the 
constitutional validity of much, perhaps most, government regulation”); Elizabeth Sepper, 
Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015); Amanda Shanor, The New 
Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133. See generally Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First 
Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915 (2016). As with my response to Post and 
Schauer, my reaction to these opinions and scholarship is that we will do better by 
acknowledging the varied First Amendment interests at stake in many of these cases, 
including cases that seem to involve garden-variety commercial regulation, and appreciating 
that there’s no avoiding a balancing of some kind. We can be confident that state interests will 
often be sufficient to overcome broad, thin speech or expressive association claims. I plan to 
work through some of this in future writing. 
161 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
162 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
163 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
164 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
165 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
166 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
167 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 3 (2015) (upholding ban on, inter 
alia, “expert advice or assistance” as part of material support for terrorism statute); Burson v. 
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding restriction on political 
speech in public forum to prevent voter intimidation and election fraud). 
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(United States v. O’Brien),168 or if it is direct regulation of the time, place, and/or 
manner of speech.169 That we easily permit regulation of perjury, bribery, and 
blackmail, and that we generally see no problem with disclosure requirements 
in various regulated industries or in commercial transactions (one could mention 
other instances of forbidding or compelling speech), is not because the 
expression at issue in these examples is invisible to the First Amendment. We 
only know that a case is easy—that the individual interest is weak and that the 
state interest is strong (or strong enough)—after we have determined that, 
though the state has regulated expression, it has done so in a way with which we 
are comfortable. In doing this kind of balancing, we take into account the values 
on which Post has been focused (democratic self-governance and construction 
of public opinion) as well as other values. For example, unless one is committed 
to a thin First Amendment or an unrealistic grounding, we protect artistic 
expression for personhood reasons that are not necessarily connected to 
democratic self-governance or construction of public opinion. To conclude that 
some speech regulation is invisible to the First Amendment is to place in the 
background, or beneath the surface, the justificatory work we are necessarily 
doing in making our value and harm assessments. In our constitutional culture, 
expression has distinctive value, and any regulation of it requires us to be alert 
to distinctive kinds of risks. So, I would agree with Post that, for example, 
bribery laws and laws compelling certain boilerplate disclosures in real estate 
deals are (almost always) constitutional. But on my approach, we would 
acknowledge that expression is being regulated, our First Amendment antennae 
would go up, and then we would see that the state interests easily trump whatever 
individual interest might be present in avoiding regulation. 
I make the same claim regarding compelled subsidies of speech. When the 
state takes my money for the speech of private actors, I have a presumptive “not 
in my name” claim of associational right, which is often hard for the state to 
overcome.170 When the state takes my money to pay for a public service 
advertisement to ask people to do something (for example, stop smoking or 
promote energy conservation), I similarly may invoke a presumptive “not in my 
name” claim of associational right. I might enjoy smoking or think it’s none of 
the state’s business, and I might think we would be better off with more energy 
consumption. We do better by acknowledging that at a sufficiently broad level 
of generality—i.e., “the state has taken my money for expression not my own”—
there is a need for justification. The (correct, in my view) holding of Johanns is 
that when compelled subsidies go for state speech, my presumptive claim of 
right is trumped by the state’s properly speaking for all citizens, whether I agree 
or disagree with the particular message (or whether I agree or disagree with the 
state’s using taxpayer dollars for any expression, or for any controversial 
 
168 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
169 See, e.g., Lee v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830, 831 (1992) 
(invalidating literature distribution ban in nonsecure areas of public airport terminals). 
170 But see supra text accompanying notes 124-55. 
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expression). The Johanns conclusion (no First Amendment right when 
compelled subsidies fund state speech)171 requires an argument, to be sure, but 
the discussion starts at the right point—with the presumption of coercive 
infringement of liberty that needs justification if it is to stand. 
III. ROBERTS, DALE, AND THE RIGHT OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION ITSELF 
I have characterized “not in my name” claims of constitutional right in terms 
of the right of expressive association. The Court’s development of the right of 
expressive association simpliciter—without clear instances of compelled speech 
or subsidy—has occurred primarily in cases about compelled membership in 
which there is concern that such compulsion would distort the expression of the 
groups in question. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,172 the Court explained 
that the Constitution offers some protection for the rights of intimate and 
expressive association. Regarding the latter, the Court explained, “we have long 
understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First 
Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide 
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural 
ends.”173 The Court upheld the application of Minnesota’s public 
accommodations anti-discrimination law to the Jaycees, concluding that 
requiring the Jaycees to admit women as full members would not impede the 
Jaycees’ freedom of expressive association,174 or that if it would, such a harm 
was outweighed by the state interest in assuring equal access to places of public 
accommodation on the basis of sex.175 Two similar decisions followed.176 
Then, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,177 the Court went the other way, 
ruling unconstitutional an application of New Jersey’s public accommodations 
anti-discrimination law that would have required the Boy Scouts to accept an 
openly gay man as an assistant scoutmaster, against the Boy Scouts’ assertion 
that “homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill.”178 
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court had held that applying the law would 
not impede the Boy Scouts’ message and that the law wasn’t compelling the Boy 
 
171 There are at least two constitutional restrictions on state speech. As I discuss in Part IV, 
the Establishment Clause places some limits on the state’s speaking in our name. And the 
Equal Protection Clause is probably best understood as a bar to state speech that denigrates 
persons on the basis of race and perhaps other protected characteristics. See CHRISTOPHER L. 
EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 124-28 
(2007); Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648, 658-65 (2013). 
I am not addressing who should have standing to bring such claims. 
172 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
173 Id. at 622. 
174 Id. at 626-28. 
175 Id. at 628-29. 
176 See N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Bd. of Dirs. 
of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987). 
177 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
178 Id. at 644. 
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Scouts to express anything,179 the Court took a different view of the matter. Here 
were the key conclusions: “The forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a 
group infringes the group’s freedom of expressive association if the presence of 
that person affects in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or 
private viewpoints.”180 And this: “Dale’s presence in the Boy Scouts would, at 
the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth 
members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a 
legitimate form of behavior.”181 But Dale was an exemplary scoutmaster—there 
was no evidence that he was using that position to advance anything about the 
rights of gay persons—and how employing Dale as a scoutmaster under 
compulsion of state law would “send a message” that the Boy Scouts “accepts” 
homosexual conduct is a bit of a mystery. Some, though, support Dale on 
different reasoning: the case is about intimate association (or the substantive due 
process rights of parents), and is thus about parental choices regarding child-
rearing;182 or the case is about expressive association but of the corporeal rather 
than messaging kind, that is, about restricting the state’s ability to insist that a 
private group must accept certain persons as leaders or members.183 That kind 
of expressive association is not the topic of this Article. To the extent we accept 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reasoning, Dale is the one time the Court has relied 
on expressive association itself, in the messaging setting, to invalidate state 
action. On the Court’s reasoning, the State was compelling the Boy Scouts to 
associate in a way that would send a message that was not properly in its name. 
We can sort it with the compelled speech and compelled subsidies for speech 
cases. 
 
179 Id. at 646-47. 
180 Id. at 648. 
181 Id. at 653. 
182 See Laura Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 862-63 
(2007). 
183 See supra note 17; see also ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: 
RECLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE 128-30 (2010) (supporting Dale as a 
right to exclude case); Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice, and Exit: The Constitutional Bounds 
of the Right of Association, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 821, 825, 834-36 (2002) (supporting a 
right of organizational autonomy generally; discussing Dale in various places without firmly 
supporting or defending its holding); Lawrence Sager, Why Churches (and, Possibly, the 
Tarpon Bay Women’s Blue Water Fishing Club) Can Discriminate, in THE RISE OF 
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 77, 85 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoë Robinson 
eds., 2016) (discussing “right of close association” without coming down either way regarding 
Dale’s holding). For general support for a right to exclude for private associations, see George 
Kateb, The Value of Association, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 35, 59 (Amy Gutmann ed., 
1998) (asserting that Roberts was wrongly decided); Nancy L. Rosenblum, Compelled 
Association: Public Standing, Self-Respect, and the Dynamic of Exclusion, in FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION, supra, at 75, 79 (contending that Roberts unsettled a public/private line 
regarding where state may regulate). See generally Randall P. Bezanson, Sheila A. Bentzen 
& C. Michael Judd, Mapping the Forms of Expressive Association, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 23 (2012) 
(giving overview of corporeal aspect of right of expressive association). 
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IV. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
The Court has thrice held that a state-sponsored religious display violates the 
Establishment Clause. In Stone v. Graham,184 without much analysis, it 
invalidated the posting of the Ten Commandments on public school classroom 
walls. In McCreary County v. ACLU,185 it invalidated the display of the Ten 
Commandments on a county courthouse wall. And in County of Allegheny v. 
ACLU,186 it invalidated a crèche (nativity scene) placed atop county courthouse 
steps. The Court has also upheld a crèche that was part of a larger holiday display 
in a public park (Lynch v. Donnelly);187 a menorah that was placed next to a 
Christmas tree and a sign promoting liberty (the other half of Allegheny);188 and 
a Ten Commandments monument that was included among many secular 
monuments on state capitol grounds (Van Orden v. Perry).189 Since Justice 
O’Connor announced the “endorsement” test in her concurring opinion in Lynch, 
the center of the Court has adopted and applied that test.190 It focuses on the 
expressive harm from state-sponsored religious displays, with a concern for the 
equal citizenship status of minority religious groups (or people with no religion 
at all). I will describe how the endorsement test appears to work and summarize 
some of the scholarship about that test. Although I am generally sympathetic to 
O’Connor’s approach, there is another way of looking at the problem in these 
cases—through the expressive association/not-in-my-name lens I have 
developed in this Article. 
In Lynch, Justice O’Connor wrote, “[t]he Establishment Clause prohibits 
government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a 
person’s standing in the political community.”191 Government “endorsement or 
disapproval of religion” is a prime example of this problem, she continued.192 
“Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full 
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to 
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. 
Disapproval sends the opposite message.”193 Justice Brennan disagreed with 
O’Connor’s willingness to uphold the crèche in Lynch, taking the concerns of 
her endorsement test to a different conclusion: “[T]he City means to express 
solidarity with the Christian message of the crèche and to dismiss other faiths as 
 
184 449 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1980) (per curiam). 
185 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005). 
186 492 U.S. 573, 579 (1989). 
187 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
188 Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 579. 
189 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (plurality opinion). 
190 Despite the Court’s personnel changes since Justice O’Connor retired in early 2006, no 
case has discarded the endorsement test in the setting of state-sponsored religious symbols, at 
least not as of this writing. 
191 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
192 Id. at 688. 
193 Id. 
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unworthy of similar attention and support.”194 Over the course of several 
opinions discussing the endorsement test, O’Connor clarified that we should 
apply the test from the point of view of a reasonable observer who is aware of 
the history and context of the symbol in question.195 Other Justices have adopted 
the endorsement test, with some variations.196 And in his opinion for the Court 
in McCreary, Justice Souter relied on the “no predominant, express religious 
purpose test”197 to similar effect as the endorsement test. His concern was the 
divisiveness and strife that get stirred up when a religious majority advances its 
religious interests openly through state action, and the way such action turns 
nonadherents into outsiders.198 
Some scholars have supported the endorsement test, focusing on the concern 
with religious effect and on the way in which a clearly sectarian, state-sponsored, 
religious symbol expresses a message that nonadherents are second-class 
citizens, or if that seems too strong, at least that they are outsiders regarding not 
only the polity’s preferred religion, but also its preferred religion as refracted 
through state power.199 There is pushback, too, from different quarters. Matthew 
Adler has advanced a general critique of expressive theories of law.200 Steven 
 
194 Id. at 713 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
195 See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 773, 779-80 
(1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Cty. of Allegheny 
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 631 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690-92 (O’Connor, J., concurring); B. Jessie Hill, Anatomy of 
the Reasonable Observer, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1407, 1412-23 (2014) (setting forth brief history 
of the reasonable observer standard in the endorsement test setting). 
196 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 707-36 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pinette, 
515 U.S. at 797-816 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592-94 (majority 
opinion); id. at 650 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
197 See McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005). For my discussion of this test, 
see Greene, Political Balance, supra note 26, at 1614-33. 
198 See McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 860-61, 863. 
199 See Thomas C. Berg, What’s Right and Wrong with “No Endorsement,” 21 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 307, 320-21 (2006) (focusing on “voluntarism” concept, would require state to 
“stay out of inherently religious matters”); Hill, supra note 195; B. Jessie Hill, Putting 
Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. 
L. REV. 491, 539-44 (2005) (arguing, despite some critique of the test, for a rebuttable 
presumption that religious symbols on government property violate the Establishment 
Clause); Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, The Politics of Religion and the Symbols of 
Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, Religious 
Participation in Public Programs: Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 
115, 148-56 (1992) (after both supporting and critiquing endorsement test, proposing a 
formulation of it that would invalidate state symbolic speech that prefers one religion over 
others). 
200 Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1363 (2000). For some pushback to Adler, see Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. 
Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000). 
Adler responded. See Matthew D. Adler, Linguistic Meaning, Nonlinguistic “Expression,” 
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Smith has argued that the endorsement test is too murky to apply consistently, 
that the reasonable observer test is a cover for smuggling in judicial views, and 
more fundamentally, that expressive harm is insufficient for an Establishment 
Clause violation.201 On this last point, Noah Feldman agrees and would, 
generally speaking, uphold state-sponsored religious symbols.202 
There is another way of looking at the problem of state-sponsored religious 
symbols. When the state speaks, it speaks in the name of all of its citizens, not 
just some. When it places a Christian nativity scene atop its county courthouse 
steps (as in Allegheny), it is saying, among other things: “We are celebrating the 
birth of Jesus Christ, our Lord and Savior.” But who is this “we?” The state 
cannot purport to speak for non-Christians (and some Christians have a concern 
with the state speaking for them in the way suggested here). To such blatantly 
foregrounded state-sponsored religious symbols, a nonbeliever may rightly 
respond, “not in my name.”203 This is so whether the person is objecting as 
taxpayer, and thus she is associated with the religious state speech through her 
tax dollars, or as citizen, and thus she is associated with the religious state speech 
through being part of the implicit “we.” There are potential federal court 
standing issues with this theory, as the Court has developed its Article III 
standing concepts.204 I put those aside for this discussion. My taxpayer or citizen 
 
and the Multiple Variants of Expressivism: A Reply to Professors Anderson and Pildes, 148 
U. PA. L. REV. 1577 (2000). 
201 Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment 
Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266 (1987). 
202 NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM—AND WHAT 
WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 15-16, 238-44 (2005). 
203 Two responses come to mind. One is that when it places the crèche atop the courthouse 
steps, the state is not speaking for all citizens, but just the Christian citizens. Generalized 
across various areas of government speech, this is not a very attractive view of the state as 
representing the people. My arguments favoring a robust role for secular state speech, see 
infra text accompanying notes 222-23, and adopting a version of republican form of 
government theory that claims the state speaks in the name of the citizens, see supra text 
accompanying notes 138-55, do not easily coexist with the view that on some matters the state 
is speaking for only a portion of the represented people. The other response is that religion 
should not be seen as distinctive, and thus that the state may speak for all the people regarding 
who is Lord and Savior just as it may on other matters. I address this later in this Article. See 
infra text accompanying notes 206 and 218-21. 
204 The Court has generally rejected citizen standing in federal court. See Lujan v. Defs. of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571-78 (1992). To the extent the concern is absence of injury in fact, 
this would be a jurisdictional bar. To the extent the concern is that citizen suits present 
generalized grievances—real, but shared by all citizens—the bar is prudential, meaning 
Congress could overcome the hurdle through appropriately tailored statutory authorization. 
See id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Congress 
has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case 
or controversy where none existed before.”); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984) 
(discussing prudential versus constitutional or jurisdictional bars to standing). States may 
permit lawsuits in state court without meeting the strictures of federal Article III standing 
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injury idea could be adopted in state courts, could be adopted by the Supreme 
Court for the federal courts if it adjusted its thinking, and in any event is meant 
as a substantive ideal theory of Establishment Clause harm that the state should 
follow regardless of whether the courts are willing to recognize a properly 
injured person. 
This expressive association way of seeing the harm from state-sponsored 
religious symbols requires us to follow the case law that views religion as 
distinctive, at least some of the time. Recall the line of argument in the 
discussion of compelled subsidies for speech. There is a presumptive 
constitutional violation from such subsidies, overcome in the setting of state 
speech because such speech is properly in the name of the citizens.205 This could 
apply as well to state-sponsored religious speech. But as I just argued, such 
expression is not properly in the name of the citizens. So we need to distinguish 
not only private speech from state speech (as in the compelled subsidies section), 
but also state secular speech (properly deemed in the name of the citizens) from 
state religious speech (not properly in the name of the citizens, because of its 
sectarian nature, and because we properly deem state sponsorship of religion 
distinctive). For those who think state religious speech is no different from state 
secular speech, my position won’t work, but neither will Justice O’Connor’s. I 
have elsewhere discussed the distinctiveness of religion in our constitutional 
order for both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, and refer the reader 
to those writings in the margin.206 I also summarize the position below in my 
discussion of Schwartzman. 
This way of approaching state-sponsored religious symbols allows us to move 
away from the complexities of the endorsement test and its focus on what some 
refer to as mere feelings of exclusion.207 Rather, we can analogize to other areas 
of First Amendment doctrine in which the concern is with the state’s taking 
action that associates citizens with ideas with which they do not wish to be 
associated. Compelling me to say “Jesus is Lord” or compelling me to fund a 
private speaker who says that are obvious constitutional violations; they are 
 
rules; in particular, they may authorize advisory opinions and citizen suits. See, e.g., 
ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989). 
The Court has permitted a limited amount of taxpayer standing to raise Establishment 
Clause challenges in federal court. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The Court has 
since whittled back on Flast. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 
(2011); Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S 587 (2007); Valley Forge 
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
205 See supra text accompanying notes 138-55. 
206 GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 26, at 139-57; Greene, Is Religion Special?, 
supra note 26, at 537; Abner S. Greene, The Incommensurability of Religion, in LAW AND 
RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 226, 226 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000); Greene, 
Political Balance, supra note 26, at 1614-33. 
207 See Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 673 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part); FELDMAN, supra note 202, at 242 (“[I]t is largely 
an interpretive choice to feel excluded by the fact of other people’s faith.”). 
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violations of my freedom of expressive association because they are “not in my 
name.” In this Part, I have argued that we should see the same thing going on 
when the state says (essentially) “Jesus is Lord” by, for example, erecting a 
crèche atop its county courthouse steps. This is harm from expression, to be sure, 
but the concern is not how I feel or how a reasonable observer would feel, not 
about second-class citizenship, but rather about an improper association of this 
contested idea with all citizens (and/or taxpayers).208 
 
 
 
Micah Schwartzman offers a different path to the conclusion that the state 
may not speak in a way that advances a contested view of religious truth.209 He 
starts with Thomas Jefferson’s proposition “that taxpayers have a right, 
grounded in the freedom of conscience, not to pay taxes for the support of 
religious speech with which they disagree.”210 If this would apply to religious, 
but not secular conscience, Schwartzman rejects it; he says there is no good 
argument for treating religion distinctively in this way, and thus Jefferson’s 
proposition, in this “narrow” sense,211 falls prey to the “equality objection.”212 
One way of rescuing Jefferson’s freedom of conscience concern would be to 
expand its scope to include objections to taxpayer-funded “support for any 
moral, philosophical, or religious views with which citizens sincerely and 
 
208 For a similar view, see Joshua Cohen, Establishment, Exclusion, and Democracy’s 
Public Reason, in REASONS AND RECOGNITION: ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF T.M. SCANLON 
256, 256-57, 267-69 (R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar & Samuel Freeman eds., 2011). Cohen’s 
argument, though, is also based in a Rawlsian contention that religious endorsement “conflicts 
with the ideal of public reason.” Id. at 271; see also id. at 257, 261. While I have some 
sympathy for this approach, see Abner S. Greene, Uncommon Ground: A Review of Political 
Liberalism by John Rawls and Life’s Dominion by Ronald Dworkin, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
646 (1994), there are tough questions about whether positions based on religion are devoid of 
public reason and whether, if they are, they are different from certain secular positions. See 
Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
763 (1993); Scott C. Idleman, Ideology as Interpretation: A Reply to Professor Greene’s 
Theory of the Religion Clauses, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 337. Furthermore, Cohen seems open to 
invalidating certain state endorsements of secular comprehensive views of the good (similar 
to Schwartzman). See Cohen, supra, at 271. I reject these views. See infra text accompanying 
notes 222-23. 
209 See Schwartzman, supra note 16. 
210 Id. at 327. This claim is a subset of the larger debate about whether religious scruples 
should buttress claims for exemption from generally applicable law. There are competing 
views on whether conscience is a good ground for exemptions. See Arneson, supra note 26, 
at 1015 n.1, 1018, 1024 (answering no); Kent Greenawalt, The Significance of Conscience, 
47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 901, 915-16 (2010) (arguing in favor, but not for religious conscience 
only); Steven D. Smith, What Does Religion Have to Do With Freedom of Conscience?, 76 
U. COLO. L. REV. 911, 916 (2005) (expressing a skeptical view on the subject). 
211 Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 327. 
212 Id. at 322, 327. 
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conscientiously disagree.”213 This approach, though, risks a kind of anarchy of 
taxpayer objection, or, put differently, a society in which the state is forbidden 
or at least seriously hamstrung from engaging in expressive activity that is 
currently taken for granted (at least in a nation such as the United States). 
Schwartzman’s solution to this problem is to accept, presumptively, a broad 
Jeffersonian conscientious objection to taxpayer-funded state speech 
“promoting any opinions with which taxpayers disagree in conscience,”214 but 
to permit this objection to be overridden by a legitimate state interest, that is, to 
use a kind of rational basis test.215 Government promotion of a contested view 
of religious truth will flunk this test, as will government promotion of other 
contested comprehensive philosophical and ethical doctrines.216 Other types of 
state speech—for example, promoting “scientific education and public 
health”217—will satisfy the rational basis test and trump the presumptive 
conscience claim of an objecting taxpayer. 
Three key differences distinguish my approach from Schwartzman’s. First, I 
support the view that, at least in our constitutional order (and probably more 
broadly), religion is special, distinctive, and that this should (and often does) 
play out in both Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause doctrine. 
Second, I support a broad, robust role for state speech, including on contested 
philosophical and ethical matters. Combining these two positions, I take a 
categorical approach to state speech—secular almost entirely constitutional (and 
often a decidedly good thing); religious almost entirely unconstitutional. 
Schwartzman believes not only that religion should not be treated as distinctive 
but also that the state should not promote any comprehensive view of the good. 
He adopts a balancing approach to the state speech problem, subjecting such 
speech to a rational basis test, often met, but failed when the state uses taxpayer 
dollars to promote religious, philosophical, or ethical comprehensive views. 
Third, Schwartzman’s focus is on harm to conscience from being forced to fund 
ideas with which one disagrees. My focus in this Article is on harm to the 
freedom of expressive association. 
On the first issue, whether religion is distinctive (at least for U.S. 
constitutional purposes): Much ink has been spilled in this debate;218 here is a 
 
213 Id. at 323. 
214 Id. at 341. 
215 See id. at 354, 382. 
216 See id. at 333 & n.46, 355-56, 382. 
217 Id. at 357. 
218 For arguments supporting the position that religion is appropriately treated as 
distinctive in U.S. constitutional law—sometimes religious claimants will get exemptions or 
accommodations where secular ones would not, and sometimes government support for 
religion will be deemed unconstitutional where state support for a secular view would not—
see Thomas C. Berg, “Secular Purpose,” Accommodations, and Why Religion Is Special 
(Enough), 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 24 (2013), Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as 
Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313 (1996), Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of 
Singling Out Religion, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2000), and Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority 
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short version of why I support the “religion is distinctive” position. For most 
religious Americans, faith in God is central to their religious perspective. 
Reliance on an extra-human source of normative authority219 points outward, 
beyond human experience that may otherwise ground a variety of secular beliefs. 
If religious beliefs were just like other forms of belief, why would so many 
people treat it specially? The theistic outward-pointing nature of religious belief, 
I have argued, is the foundation for some Establishment Clause restrictions on 
state action, in particular, a rule that laws should not be based in an express, 
predominant religious purpose.220 We can view the Free Exercise Clause as 
specially protecting (at times) religious practice, as balancing or compensating 
for the Establishment Clause restriction,221 or more generally as protecting 
practice based in belief that is inaccessible to nonbelievers and thus easily 
subject to legislative negligence (or worse), that is, a failure to appreciate and 
account for the practices in question. Thus, paying special constitutional 
attention to religious conscience is not unfairly unequal. We might treat secular 
conscience differently, but the difference is grounded in our textually, 
historically, and normatively justifiable concern for how following God’s 
authority, for some, intersects with both lawmaking and a need to be free of (at 
least some of) the law’s commands. My argument in this Article for a distinctive 
 
of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159, 1160, 1169, 1184 (2013) 
(advancing a theistic ground for treating religion as constitutionally distinctive, with 
apparently stronger results for free exercise-backed exemptions than for establishment-based 
invalidation of state action). See also Cohen, supra note 208, at 256-57, 267, 271 (advancing 
reasons for treating religion as distinctive in Establishment Clause setting, while leaving open 
possibility that some secular positions might be similarly problematic). For arguments 
rejecting religious distinctiveness in U.S. constitutional law, in addition to Schwartzman’s 
piece discussed here, see EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 171, Jean Cohen, Freedom of 
Religion, Inc.: Whose Sovereignty?, 44 NETH. J. LEGAL PHIL. 169, 176, 208 (2015) (expressing 
concern that the other side bases its argument on a jurisdictional clash between God’s 
authority and the state’s), Sager, supra note 183, at 79-80, and Micah J. Schwartzman, What 
if Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012). Regarding Jean Cohen’s concern 
that support for religious distinctiveness seems to turn on deferring to a claim of God’s 
authority: one can endorse a religious distinctiveness position from an agnostic perspective 
on the issue of God’s existence, as I do. For the view that some of those who adopt the agnostic 
position will end up in a (somewhat) similar position on the religious distinctiveness question 
as those who base their distinctiveness support on belief in God and the priority of his 
authority, see Paulsen, supra, at 1163 n.7, 1165 n.9. See also PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC 
AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION (2011). 
219 Or generative/creative authority. For constitutional law purposes, God’s normative 
authority and its possible role in grounding secular law is what matters. 
220 GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 26, at 150-55; Greene, Political Balance, 
supra note 26, at 1614-33. For cases supporting the rule against express, predominant 
religious purpose backing state action, see McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005), 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), and 
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
221 See GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 26, at 155-57; Greene, Political 
Balance, supra note 26, at 1633-40. 
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Establishment Clause-based disability on state religious speech is grounded in 
these sorts of claims for religious distinctiveness in our constitutional order, and 
in Supreme Court doctrine that considers state speech endorsing contested 
religious views of truth as unconstitutional in a way that the Court has never 
assumed would be problematic for secular positions, even based in 
comprehensive philosophical or ethical views. 
On the second issue, the appropriate scope of government speech: I have 
endorsed the view that the state may speak and pay agents to speak, not only to 
promote relatively uncontested matters of science and public health and the like, 
but also to advance what may be contested views on social issues, indeed to 
advance positions in such debates that may stem from deeply contested and 
comprehensive philosophical or ethical notions of the good.222 The state speaks 
for us in ways that we sometimes fail to do for ourselves, and the position of the 
state as a public, collective entity is different from the position of private actors 
and individuals. Thus, the state may seek to promote a certain way of viewing 
the environment, a way that has its roots in deep and contested positions about 
stewardship and what we owe future generations. It may seek to promote a 
specific conception of democracy, at home and abroad, and counterpose that 
conception not only against other conceptions of democracy but also against 
(say) communism or socialism. It may advocate for a wide array of school 
choices, or it may push for the opposite, a public school that everyone attends 
(push for, but not insist on).223 These are just some examples of how the state 
may dig deeply into the foundations of contested social policy matters, and 
advance not only social science-inflected instrumental arguments on behalf of 
its positions, but also the philosophical or ethical roots of such arguments. The 
thinner view of liberal democracy—that the state should abstain from promotion 
of contested views of the good—is a poor fit for our constitutional order. It 
sometimes relies on the incorrect idea that citizens will defer too strongly to the 
state (why? so long as the state is transparent as speaker or funder of speech, 
citizens will know whom to blame, and can give credit or critique as they do 
with any source of speech). It sometimes relies on too libertarian a view of liberal 
democracy; whatever one thinks of hot debates about state regulatory authority, 
state speech power need not be limited in the name of liberty, because the state 
is just one speaker and, if just speaking, is not acting coercively. And it 
sometimes takes a Rawlsian notion of public reason too far, believing that 
reliance on comprehensive philosophical or ethical views places the basis of 
 
222 See sources cited supra notes 37 and 109. 
223 See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (invalidating law requiring 
children between eight and sixteen years of age to attend public school, as against challenge 
from private religious and military schools). I have questioned Pierce on the ground that it 
helps support a parental monopoly over children’s education, and that a multiple repositories 
of power theory regarding children might support mandatory public schooling. Abner S. 
Greene, Civil Society and Multiple Repositories of Power, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 477, 489-92 
(2000); Abner S. Greene, Why Vouchers Are Unconstitutional, and Why They’re Not, 13 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 397, 406-08 (1999). 
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state action beyond generally accessible understanding. Why should we believe 
that, though, about nontheistic positions? In short, there are good reasons to 
think broad government speech is at least permissible in our constitutional order, 
and perhaps also to think it is advisable. 
These two points, combined, help ground my approach regarding freedom of 
expressive association in the setting of compelled support for state speech. There 
is a weak, broad, prima facie right not to fund the expression of others, whether 
those others are private or public actors. One may wish not to be associated with 
such expression, even if no misattribution is involved, that is, if everyone knows 
one’s connection to the expression is just because of state compulsion and thus 
there is no endorsement (real or imagined) in play. This right, however, gives 
way to strong enough state interests. There is, generally speaking, a strong 
enough countervailing state interest in using taxpayer dollars to fund state 
speech. My principal contention earlier was that the “not in my name” type of 
argument that supports the presumptive expressive association claim disappears 
when taxpayer dollars are funding state speech, because in a liberal democracy 
such as ours, state speech is appropriately thought to be “in our name.” One can 
now add to this argument the more general normative support for a thick view 
of government speech I offered just above. Thus, state speech has special value, 
in part because it is in our name, the name of the citizen-taxpayers. Finally, if 
we accept that religion is distinctive in our constitutional order, then we can 
reanimate the expressive association claim, distinctively against compelled 
support for state religious speech, because such speech is not properly in our 
name. 
On the third issue, the harm to conscience versus the harm to expressive 
association: In this Article, I have been developing an argument for seeing 
freedom of expressive association as a common theme in several areas of First 
Amendment law, and harm to such freedom as a way of understanding what’s 
at stake in these areas. The right is broad, and weak; although in some instances 
the harm is profound, and may be described in other ways, casting it as an 
expressive association right is meant to capture a somewhat disparate set of fact 
patterns and set up a presumptive entitlement, but not commit to too much up 
front about the strength of the right. Claims of conscience are stronger, require 
more normative backing, and should be harder to overcome.224 
 
224 Indeed, the compelled speech and compelled subsidies for speech cases rely little on 
mentions of conscience. Barnette would seem the most obvious place for this, but as an 
analytical tool, conscience is mentioned only in Justice Murphy’s concurrence, see W. Va. 
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645-46 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“But there 
is before us the right of freedom to believe, freedom to worship one’s Maker according to the 
dictates of one’s conscience, a right which the Constitution specifically shelters.”), and in 
Justice Frankfurter’s dissent, which rejects exemptions generally, including for religious 
conscience in a case such as Barnette, id. at 654-56, 658, 662 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In 
his Pacific Gas dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist summarized the right not to speak cases as 
turning on individual conscience, then pivoted to denying that business corporations can make 
such a claim. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1986) 
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Perhaps turning to the dictionary may help. One relevant definition of 
“associate” is “to connect in the mind or imagination”;225 “association” can 
mean “[a] mental connection or relation between thoughts, feelings, ideas, or 
sensations.”226 Conscience is “[a]n awareness of morality in regard to one’s 
behavior; a sense of right and wrong that urges one to act morally.”227 Assuming 
that acting under legal compulsion can harm conscience,228 the harm to 
conscience from being confronted with a law that runs counter to one’s sense of 
right and wrong cuts deeply to one’s sense of self. In his discussion of compelled 
speech, Schwartzman refers to “a form of acquiescence in, or complicity with, 
the government’s view.”229 In his discussion of compelled support of private 
speech, he refers to the subject’s belief that “giving in to the state’s demands 
 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Abood is almost entirely about association; here’s the one mention 
of conscience: “For at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should 
be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one’s beliefs should be shaped by his 
mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.” Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 
431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977). Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court in Glickman distinguished 
Abood in this way: “Here, however, requiring respondents to pay the assessments cannot be 
said to engender any crisis of conscience.” Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 
U.S. 457, 472 (1997). In his United Foods dissent, Justice Breyer maintained that no 
conscience argument was available in that case (and was not in Glickman), contrasting 
Barnette and Wooley. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 423-24 (2001) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Finally, Masterpiece Cakeshop refers several times to the conscience-
based claims of various bakers, but in the service of developing the as-applied Free Exercise 
Clause holding, not as part of a compelled speech discussion. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. 
Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1730-31 (2018). As I have argued, conscience 
is mostly not the best way to understand the compelled speech and compelled subsidies for 
speech holdings as a group. 
225 Associate, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 17. 
226 Association, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 17. 
227 Conscience, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 17. Other definitions of 
“conscience” also make clear it is about one’s sense of morality, of right and wrong action. 
See VISCHER, supra note 183, at 3 (noting that conscience is “person’s judgment of right and 
wrong”); Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and Religion, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1457, 1463 (“Conscience is a universal faculty that applies moral knowledge to one’s past 
and future acts, a moral judge.”); Greenawalt, supra note 210, at 904 (noting that conscience 
is usually about “judgments believed by those making them to be of considerable moral 
importance”); Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Four Conceptions of Conscience, in NOMOS XL: INTEGRITY 
AND CONSCIENCE 13, 14 (Ian Shapiro & Robert Adams eds., 1998) (explaining that the core 
idea linking conceptions of conscience is “idea of a capacity . . . to sense or immediately 
discern that what he or she has done, is doing, or is about to do (or not do) is wrong, bad, and 
worthy of disapproval”); Steven D. Smith, The Tenuous Case for Conscience, 10 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 325, 328 (2005) (“[W]hen we describe an act as being done from 
‘conscience’ we usually mean at least to say that the person in question acted on the basis of 
a sincere conviction about what is morally required or forbidden.”). 
228 This requires further argument, because one could disobey the law and suffer the legal 
consequences, rather than comply with the law and risk harm to conscience. 
229 Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 351. 
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would be tantamount to negating her own moral views.”230 And in his discussion 
of compelled support of state speech, he refers to being compromised in one’s 
moral views and integrity.231 Both types of compelled funders “have an interest 
in following their moral values and in adhering to a principle of integrity.”232 
Let’s assume no misattribution, and let us assume that the fact patterns in 
question involve compelled expression of one sort or another—compelled 
speech or compelled subsidization of speech (including state religious 
expression). Seeing the problem as one of expressive association foregrounds 
our control (or lack thereof) over the messages with which we’re connected. The 
harm from losing such control is easy to see in the misattribution setting (where 
the audience reasonably but mistakenly believes the subject supports or endorses 
the message). But even if the audience would appreciate the fact of legal 
compulsion and draw no conclusion regarding the subject’s actual beliefs, the 
subject is still connected with the message, in either the compelled speech or 
compelled subsidization of speech setting. The freedom of expressive 
association, in these settings, includes the right to be free of what one believes 
to be the taint of connection with a disliked idea, at least to be free of the state’s 
creating such a taint without one’s permission, and to not feel compelled to speak 
to explain one’s disaffection for the idea when one would prefer to remain silent. 
All of this could be true without reaching the depths of conscientious objection. 
One’s integrity in the sense of compromising one’s moral views might not be at 
stake when one is (merely) connected/associated with disliked ideas. Displaying 
an unwanted license plate motto or funding an unwanted message may be an 
infringement of one’s right to associate with ideas of one’s choosing without 
infringing on a deeper sense of right and wrong. 
Schwartzman sometimes writes of conscience and association (somewhat) 
interchangeably. Thus, in discussing compelled speech, he says “public 
affirmation may associate her with [a moral doctrine she rejects],”233 and then 
adds the phrase quoted above, “form of acquiescence in, or complicity with, the 
government’s view.”234 And regarding the taxpayer who objects to compelled 
funding for private speech, hers could be a “claim that a financial obligation 
targeted for the support of [the moral doctrine she rejects] . . . associates her with 
that doctrine.”235 Furthermore, Schwartzman includes a (helpful, for my 
purposes) section called “Money Isn’t Association.”236 Here he confronts the 
argument “against equating money, at least in the form of taxes, with association 
or complicity.”237 The argument is that “conditions of moral responsibility—
 
230 Id. at 352. 
231 See id. at 352-53. 
232 Id. at 354. 
233 Id. at 351. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 352. 
236 Id. at 376. 
237 Id. 
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making a difference, having control, intentionality, and voluntariness—may 
seem lacking in the case of taxpayers funding government speech to which they 
object.”238 Schwartzman’s first response is that this approach to evaluating 
individual moral responsibility may not be a good fit “for evaluating our 
involvement in large scale collective and cooperative action, including 
participation in systems of democratic governance.”239 His second response is 
that perhaps “citizens ought to see themselves as contributing voluntarily to 
support the state. They are not primarily motivated by coercion but by the idea 
that the state represents them, that it acts in their name.”240 He adds that one 
would need to work up a more complete account of complicity or accountability 
in this setting; such an account might support a limited version of protected 
conscientious objection.241 
I argued above that state speech is properly considered “in our name.”242 Here 
I want to resist the equating (if that is what it is) of arguments from conscience 
with arguments about association. We should reserve the language of 
association, in the settings discussed here, for a connection between subject and 
compelled message (either in the compelled speech or compelled subsidization 
of speech setting) that does not necessarily reach to a level of conscientious 
objection or a sense of moral complicity in the support for such message. I might 
have no view or a tentative or complex view about the morality of a particular 
message that is part of compelled speech or compelled subsidy for speech, but 
still object to having my good name connected with the expression, because I 
prefer to be an agent in a more knowing and volitional way of the messages with 
which I am connected.243 
One final point to round out this comparison of Schwartzman’s approach to 
mine: Although money may be part of an expressive association claim, it isn’t 
necessary in the settings I have covered. Earlier I explained that the harm to the 
 
238 Id. at 377. 
239 Id. at 378. 
240 Id. at 379. 
241 Id. at 380. 
242 See supra text accompanying notes 138-55. 
243 David Gaebler offers an eloquent defense for the compelled speech and subsidies for 
speech line of cases by focusing on conscience. David P. Gaebler, First Amendment 
Protection Against Government Compelled Expression and Association, 23 B.C. L. REV. 995 
(1982). Although he also discusses the outward concern about how the world perceives our 
ideas, his core concern is the inward one, which he refers to as an “interest in selfhood” or 
“freedom of conscience.” Id. at 1003-04. Gaebler refers to the humiliation and shame one 
feels from not standing up for one’s beliefs, from not defying the state on a matter of principle, 
from acquiescing. Id. at 1005 n.71, 1006, 1012. To the extent that this argument is similar to 
Schwartzman’s focus on conscience, my response is similar—that kind of deep hit, from a 
sense of contributing to a moral wrong, may be present in some of the compelled 
speech/subsidies for speech/expressive association cases, but not always. A broader focus on 
the associational/not-in-my-name harm may better capture what’s going on in the case law. 
Also, whether one feels the pangs of shame and disgrace from acquiescing to the state in some 
of these settings varies across individuals. 
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Maynards from having to display “Live Free or Die” on their state-issued license 
plate is the same whether or not they are paying taxes to help fund the state 
speech.244 If there is a First Amendment violation, it is because the state is 
compelling the Maynards to foster a message they would prefer not to foster. 
This is an expressive association harm with a kicker, and the kicker is the use of 
the Maynards’ personal property.245 As I will discuss further below,246 although 
the Johanns plaintiffs lost because the speech involved was that of the 
government, they might have won if a reasonable observer would have attributed 
the “Beef. It’s What’s for Dinner” ads to them. This is so whether or not the 
government had compelled them to pay for the speech. Finally, I explained 
earlier that the “not in my name” Establishment Clause claim from state 
sectarian religious speech holds for the citizen as well as for the taxpayer 
(consider a non-taxpaying citizen).247 Schwartzman’s discussion of conscience 
is about money and its connection to unwanted speech (thus the title of his 
article, Conscience, Speech, and Money). My expressive association arguments 
may involve a money connection, but need not. 
V. MISATTRIBUTION 
We have seen that the freedom of expressive association grounds 
constitutional claims of compelled speech, compelled subsidies for speech, and 
establishment of religion, and that at least once the Court has relied upon 
expressive association as a stand-alone basis for recognizing a constitutional 
claim. The common theme is that the state sometimes acts in a way that 
associates one with a message with which one does not wish to be associated, 
either by others or just in one’s own mind. And this is so even if no one (or at 
least the reasonable person) mistakenly believes that the individual in question 
endorses the message. The expressive association claims in these settings can be 
restated as “not in my name” claims of constitutional right. 
We can now return to the opening problem of this Article—should we 
recognize a certain type of misattribution as grounding a claim of constitutional 
violation, in either the compelled subsidies for speech or Establishment Clause 
setting? Now that we can see a common thread between compelled subsidy and 
Establishment Clause claims, we are in a better position to examine whether 
mistaken attribution as to speaker should matter, and if so, how. Before turning 
to the lingering problems from Johanns and Pinette, I will first discuss the 
misattribution issue in the compelled speech setting. 
 
244 See supra note 95. 
245 The kicker, though, falls short of being an insult to human dignity or anything of that 
sort. See supra note 92. 
246 See infra text accompanying note 256; see also Klass, supra note 110, at 1122. 
247 See supra text accompanying notes 203-04; see also infra text accompanying note 281 
(making similar point in misattribution setting). 
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A. Compelled Speech 
When the Court has invalidated state action as unconstitutional compelled 
speech, we can see a grounding in the right of expressive association, the 
assertions as “not in my name” claims of constitutional right. Although that is a 
serious matter, one might think a misattribution ground is more serious. If a 
reasonable observer believes I endorse the pledge of allegiance (when I do not) 
or endorse “Live Free or Die” (when I do not), then that observer is acting on a 
false picture of who I am. That could affect me in various harmful ways, perhaps 
comparable to the ways in which defamation law is concerned with harm. 
Defamation law, though, is about false statements diminishing one’s 
reputation,248 and perhaps we could say falsely believing someone supports the 
values contained in the pledge of allegiance or in “Live Free or Die” does not 
(necessarily, or at all) diminish one’s reputation. My reference to defamation 
law is therefore not about diminished reputation, but about erroneous 
understanding of all types of someone’s values, when caused by compelled 
speech. My claim in this paragraph is that although a compelled speech “not in 
my name” claim of constitutional right should be considered actionable even 
without misattribution, the harm is more serious when there is misattribution. 
Note that the type of misattribution in the compelled speech cases from 
Barnette through Becerra is somewhat different from the type at issue in 
Johanns and Pinette. In the Barnette through Becerra line of cases, the 
government is requiring an individual or company to utter or physically host or 
display either a state-chosen message or the message of another private party. In 
each of these cases, the identity of the speaker is clear. The misattribution 
question is whether a reasonable observer would mistakenly think the speaker 
endorses the speech, and this turns at least in part on whether the observer knows 
the speech is compelled. If the observer would miss the fact of compulsion, and 
erroneously conclude the speaker has chosen (and thus endorses) the message, 
that would be a ground for invalidating the compelled speech (although as we 
saw, this is rarely so). The lingering problems from Johanns and Pinette arise at 
a prior stage of analysis, where the identity of the speaker might be unclear. If a 
reasonable observer would mistake state speech for the speech of an individual 
or company, or would mistake private speech for the speech of the state, such 
mistakes would entail misattribution of the message to the (mistakenly assumed) 
speaker. Mistake as to endorsement of message follows from mistake as to 
speaker identity. 
 
248 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (laying out 
elements of cause of action for defamation). The Court has, though, rejected a claim under 
the Due Process Clause for state action that defames, unless the state action also alters or 
extinguishes a “right or status previously recognized by state law.” Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 
693, 711-12 (1976); see also Greene, supra note 90, at 833-34. But see Aziz Huq, When 
Government Defames, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2017, at A19 (proposing federal legislation 
authorizing defamation action for declaratory relief against federal officials). 
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B. Compelled Subsidies for Speech 
Let’s return to Johanns.249 Recall that the major premise of the holding, with 
which no Justice disagreed, is that compelled subsidies for government speech 
are (almost always)250 constitutional. I have defended that holding as a proper 
exception to the Abood rule of “no compelled subsidies for the speech of 
another.” The rule is based in the expressive association “not in my name” right 
not to be connected through one’s funds to expression not of one’s choosing; the 
exception is that state speech is properly in the name of all citizens. What divided 
the Justices in Johanns was the application of the government speech exception 
to the facts of the case. There was pretty strong evidence that a reasonable 
observer would believe the “Beef. It’s What’s for Dinner” ads were the private 
speech of the beef producers, and not the government speech of the USDA. 
Under the Abood principle, and the reasoning of United Foods applying that 
principle, the objecting beef producers would seem to have a valid constitutional 
objection to the ads. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, was not willing to 
accept this conclusion on the record in the case, but said he was open (possibly) 
to a constitutional claim from misattribution. He wrote, “If a viewer would 
identify the speech as respondents’, however, the analysis would be 
different.”251 This would become a compelled speech, rather than compelled 
subsidy, argument, said Scalia.252 “On some set of facts,” he continued, “this 
[compelled speech] theory might (again, we express no view on the point) form 
the basis for an as-applied challenge—if it were established, that is, that 
individual beef advertisements were attributed to respondents.”253 Although 
Scalia uses the terms “a viewer” and “were attributed to,” I take the dicta to refer 
to what a reasonable observer might think about the ads, rather than any 
viewer.254 On the facts as presented, Justice Souter in dissent had the better of 
it; a reasonable person would think the ads were those of the beef producers, and 
not the USDA.255 But we can put aside whether Souter was correct on the facts 
of the case. What interests me here is how we should properly ground such a 
misattribution claim, whether it should be actionable, and how it relates to the 
 
249 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005). 
250 Cases invalidating government religious speech, see supra text accompanying notes 
184-86, would require us to modify the claim in the text, to the extent that the compelled 
subsidies for such speech (tax dollars) are implicated in the constitutional violation. 
251 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 564 n.7 (emphasis omitted). 
252 Id. at 564-65. 
253 Id. at 565. 
254 For a similar debate, see Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 
753, 779-80 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(focusing on informed reasonable observer, aware of history and context), and id. at 800 n.5, 
807 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (focusing on whether some reasonable viewers might perceive 
endorsement). 
255 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 577-78 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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more general expressive association/not-in-my-name type of claim I am 
suggesting threads through the cases discussed in this Article. 
I agree with Justice Scalia that a Johanns misattribution case would not 
properly be considered a compelled subsidy case. Formally, one would still be 
subsidizing the government, and thus Abood and Keller, which turn on 
compelled subsidy of a private party’s speech, are inapposite. Scalia says a 
Johanns misattribution case would be a compelled speech case, but doesn’t offer 
much of an argument for that conclusion. The argument could be the following, 
although it is for an expressive association violation,256 not compelled speech 
per se. If a reasonable observer would (mistakenly) believe that advertisement X 
is mine, the harm from such misattribution is similar to the harm from 
misattribution in the compelled speech cases (if there is any such harm in those 
cases). But in the compelled speech cases, someone has in fact been forced to 
speak or host/display another’s speech. A Johanns misattribution case lacks this 
component—the complaining party has not actually spoken or hosted/displayed 
speech. Here is a better way to look at it: Suppose a case with no compelled 
funding, and no actual compelled speech, but the state still does something that 
leads the reasonable viewer to mistakenly attribute message X to the 
complainant. For example, assume the Johanns facts without a compelled 
subsidy, and with an ad that expressly attributes “Beef. It’s What’s for Dinner” 
to a particular private beef producer who, let us also assume, does not desire 
such attribution. So we have no compelled subsidy and no compelled speech 
(because the government is running the ad), but a clear instance of misattribution 
to which the falsely tagged party objects. Following the line of argument from 
this Article, that party should be able to successfully challenge the ad as a 
violation of its freedom of expressive association, of the “not in my name” 
variety. 
This kind of rights violation is arguably worse than that at issue in Abood and 
its progeny. In those cases, we’re assuming no misattribution, but there is still 
an actionable claim that the state has associated one with speech (via compelled 
subsidy) with which one does not wish to be associated. That is a violation of 
one’s right to control not only the content of one’s messages, but also of the 
messages with which one is associated (insofar as we are talking about state 
action causing the unwanted association). In a Johanns misattribution case—
either the kind Justice Souter believed existed in Johanns (and that Justice Scalia 
was open to considering in a future case), or the kind in the hypothetical in the 
previous paragraph—not only is one associated with a message against one’s 
will, but also the reasonable viewer mistakenly believes one endorses that 
message. As with my argument regarding compelled speech, state action that 
 
256 See Greene, supra note 90, at 836; see also Johanns, 544 U.S. at 568 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“The government may not, consistent with the First Amendment, associate 
individuals or organizations involuntarily with speech by attributing an unwanted message to 
them, whether or not those individuals fund the speech, and whether or not the message is 
under the government’s control.”). 
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creates a false impression of endorsement is more harmful than state action that 
creates an association of message with person that everyone (or the reasonable 
observer) knows the person doesn’t endorse, but with which she nonetheless 
does not wish to be associated. 
C. Establishment Clause 
Recall Pinette. The KKK sponsored a Latin cross in a state-owned plaza 
surrounding the capitol in Columbus, Ohio. The Court held by a seven-to-two 
vote that this doesn’t violate the Establishment Clause, and thus to deny the 
display would violate the KKK’s free speech rights (to display their expression 
equally with others in a public forum).257 The seven-Justice majority divided, 
though, over the possibility of a misattribution claim in a situation such as this, 
that is, over whether even though the speech is formally private, it might be 
mistaken for that of the state, thus bringing the Establishment Clause back into 
play as a ground for denying the display. Justice Scalia’s opinion for a four-
Justice plurality deemed this an issue of “transferred endorsement.”258 Referring 
to precedent holding that religious speech may not be barred from public forums 
or designated public forums259—because it’s not reasonable to assume the state 
is endorsing any speaker in such forums, including the religious speakers—
Scalia argued that “erroneous conclusions do not count.”260 He added, “It has 
radical implications for our public policy to suggest that neutral laws are invalid 
whenever hypothetical observers may—even reasonably—confuse an incidental 
benefit to religion with state endorsement.”261 Scalia posited that the outcome 
might be different if the state “fostered or encouraged the mistake.”262 
 
257 Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented, in separate opinions, deeming the display a 
violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 797-816 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 817-18 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009), the Court 
held that privately donated monuments that become permanent displays in public parks after 
government approval constitute state speech. The Court distinguished Pinette on the ground 
that the displays in that case were temporary. See id. at 480. In Summum, although the City 
had permitted erection of a Ten Commandments monument (and had rejected a monument 
from a small religious group), no Establishment (or Free Exercise or Equal Protection) Clause 
issue was presented; the only issue before the Court was whether public forum analysis should 
apply or whether the speech was that of the state. 
258 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 764 (plurality opinion). 
259 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395-97 (1993) 
(holding that there was no Establishment Clause violation for a religious group to use public 
school classrooms for after-school activities on an equal footing with other groups); Widmar 
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1981) (holding similarly in university setting). 
260 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 765 (plurality opinion). 
261 Id. at 768 (emphasis omitted). This is a bit confusing even for what Scalia was arguing. 
The issue wouldn’t be whether a “neutral law” should be deemed invalid, but whether a 
specific private display might be held to violate the Establishment Clause because it would 
be reasonably mistaken as state speech. 
262 Id. at 766. 
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Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, concurred in part and 
in the judgment, leaving open the possibility of an Establishment Clause 
violation on the endorsement test, even if the speech is formally that of a private 
party. A reasonable observer might, in some scenarios, nonetheless believe the 
state is endorsing a religious message.263 So far so good—or so clear—but at 
this point, O’Connor’s opinion gets murky. She seems to agree with Justice 
Scalia that there could be an Establishment Clause violation if the state actively 
intended or encouraged viewers to believe it was endorsing the religious 
message.264 But there could be endorsement even without that, and even if the 
speech is formally private. According to O’Connor:  
This is so not because of ‘transferred endorsement,’ or mistaken attribution 
of private speech to the State, but because the State’s own actions 
(operating the forum in a particular manner and permitting the religious 
expression to take place therein), and their relationship to the private 
speech at issue, actually convey a message of endorsement.265  
But if we’re not talking about the state fostering/encouraging/intending a 
mistake, and if we’re not talking about mistake absent that, then what are we 
talking about? Maybe this: “At some point, for example, a private religious 
group may so dominate a public forum that a formal policy of equal access is 
transformed into a demonstration of approval.”266 And this: “Other 
circumstances may produce the same effect—whether because of the fortuity of 
geography, the nature of the particular public space, or the character of the 
religious speech at issue, among others.”267 So O’Connor seems focused on a 
situation in which the state skews the public forum in the direction of a particular 
religious display. But if she is willing to deem that an Establishment Clause 
violation—even if the speech is formally private—then she is willing to adopt 
at least a version of a misattribution or mistake argument. 
Justice Souter also penned an opinion concurring in part and in the judgment, 
in which Justices O’Connor and Breyer joined.268 He stated that “in some 
circumstances an intelligent observer may mistake private, unattended religious 
displays in a public forum for government speech endorsing religion.”269 He 
added that “[u]nless we are to retreat entirely to government intent and abandon 
consideration of effects, it makes no sense to recognize a public perception of 
 
263 Id. at 777 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
264 See id. 
265 Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 
266 Id. 
267 Id. at 778. 
268 These three Justices were at the center of the Court on this issue, each joining the same 
two concurrences in part and in the judgment. And it is clear from their dissenting opinions 
that Justices Stevens and Ginsburg would deem some mistaken impressions in settings such 
as this to be Establishment Clause violations. See id. at 797-816 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. 
at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
269 Id. at 785 (Souter, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
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endorsement as a harm only in that subclass of cases in which the government 
owns the display.”270 In this case, there was great concern about a possible 
conclusion of state endorsement of religion, even via a privately sponsored 
symbol: “[The Latin cross the KKK sought to erect] was displayed immediately 
in front of the Ohio Statehouse, with the government’s flags flying nearby, and 
the government’s statues close at hand. For much of the time the cross was 
supposed to stand on the square, it would have been the only private display on 
the public plot . . . .”271 Importantly, though, for Souter as well as for O’Connor, 
the KKK had promised to erect a disclaimer stating that the cross was private 
and without government support.272 For my discussion, the most interesting 
aspects of Souter’s opinion are his openness to the possibility of an intelligent 
observer mistaking private displays for government endorsement of religion, 
and O’Connor joining the opinion (despite saying, in her opinion, that the 
concern might not be about mistaken attribution of private speech to the state273). 
The Court addressed a related possible Establishment Clause mistake issue in 
Good News Club v. Milford Central School.274 A public school district allowed 
all manner of meetings and groups to use public school facilities after hours but 
denied such use to a group that would engage in some religious instruction.275 
Following precedent, the Court held that this denial was not required by the 
Establishment Clause (a reasonable observer should not assume the school 
district is endorsing any of the messages advanced in the forum), and was a 
violation of the Free Speech Clause.276 Writing for a six-Justice majority, Justice 
Thomas refused to accept the possibility, on the facts at hand, that schoolchildren 
would mistakenly think the school had endorsed the religious speech.277 He went 
further: “We decline to employ Establishment Clause jurisprudence using a 
modified heckler’s veto, in which a group’s religious activity can be proscribed 
on the basis of what the youngest members of the audience might 
misperceive.”278 This does, though, leave the door open for different facts that 
would more strongly suggest reasonable mistake (perhaps on the part of an adult 
reasonable observer or a reasonable observer generally, not a young child). 
Justice Breyer, concurring in part, and Justice Souter (joined by Justice 
Ginsburg), dissenting, were open to a misattribution claim in a case such as 
this.279 We can assume Justice Stevens would have been too (his dissent was 
 
270 Id. at 787. 
271 Id. at 792. 
272 See id. at 776 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment); id. at 783, 793-
94 (Souter, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
273 Id. at 776-78 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
274 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
275 Id. at 108-09. 
276 Id. at 107-19. 
277 See id. at 113-19. 
278 Id. at 119. 
279 Id. at 128 (Breyer, J., concurring in part); id. at 142-44 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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solely on the free speech issue).280 Also, Good News Club involves religious 
speech as part of public school facilities opened as a limited public forum, which 
is a different setting from the religious symbols cases on which I am focused. 
On the theory I have developed in this Article, a reasonable mistake of fact as 
to speaker identity should ground an Establishment Clause claim. The 
Establishment Clause injury is similar to—though not identical to—the 
Establishment Clause injury in the non-mistake case. Let’s assume the Latin 
cross in Pinette was erected by the State of Ohio. That would be an easy case for 
Establishment Clause invalidation under either the endorsement test or the 
expressive association/not-in-my-name argument I have advanced. Even if we 
put aside the second-class citizenship expressive harm argument from the 
endorsement test, any citizen could properly argue that sectarian religious 
speech of this sort is not properly in the name of the state, and not properly in 
the name of the citizens thereof. For the taxpayer plaintiff, the rule against 
compelled subsidies for unwanted expression holds (of the Establishment Clause 
variety), as against the government speech exception to that rule.281 
Now let’s assume that the cross is privately sponsored, but that the reasonable 
observer would take it to be the state’s speech. A citizen plaintiff could argue 
that the state is engaging in sectarian religious speech, improperly in the name 
of its citizens (and thus improperly in its own name, as well). A taxpayer plaintiff 
would not have a claim, because her funds are not being used for the expression, 
which is formally private. The harm to the citizen claimant is the same as in the 
non-mistake case: the state should not be acting in a way that actually advances 
a sectarian religious message in its name (and thus its citizens’ names), and it 
should not act in a way that would lead a reasonable observer (even mistakenly) 
to see it as advancing a sectarian religious message in its name and in the name 
of its citizens.282 We assume that in the mistake setting the average person thinks 
the state is engaging in the religious expression, and if my argument is correct, 
then there is an expressive association harm to all citizens. 
One final point. Sometimes there is a complex state-private partnership 
involved with displaying religious symbols.283 In Lynch, the park was owned by 
a private nonprofit group; the holiday display (including the crèche) was the 
city’s.284 In Allegheny, the county permitted a private Catholic group to place its 
crèche on the county courthouse staircase, with a plaque stating the private group 
had donated the crèche.285 In Van Orden, a private group donated the Ten 
 
280 Id. at 130-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
281 I discussed the federal courts standing issues for citizen and taxpayer plaintiffs earlier 
in this Article. See supra text accompanying note 204. 
282 In these situations, a disclaimer might cure or prevent the problem. See supra note 100 
and text accompanying note 272. 
283 For an excellent treatment of this kind of situation, see Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed 
Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (2008). 
284 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984). 
285 Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 579-81 (1989). 
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Commandments monument to the State of Texas, which then erected it on the 
state capitol grounds along with other monuments of its choosing.286 The Ten 
Commandments monument bears an inscription stating the private donor’s 
name.287 One question in each of these cases is whether the state or a private 
party is speaking, or whether the speech is a joint effort. Whether the state alone 
or the state-with-private party is speaking, however, one might conclude that the 
state has unconstitutionally endorsed a particular religion or that it has 
unconstitutionally sponsored sectarian religious expression that is not properly 
in its name or the name of its citizens. For my purposes in this Article, I need 
not figure out when the state is properly deemed the—or a—speaker. I am 
assuming that at least in some cases we properly tag the state with speech 
(sometimes as a collaborative actor), and it is those cases with which I am 
concerned. 
CONCLUSION 
We have a constitutional right against the state’s forcing us to be associated 
with expression with which we do not wish to be associated. The freedom of 
expressive association is not stated in our Constitution’s text. Rather, it is 
derived from the various provisions of the First Amendment, most notably the 
Free Speech Clause. As the freedom of speech protects, among other things, our 
right to shape how we present ourselves to the world, so does the freedom of 
expressive association protect us from the state’s shaping us by connecting us to 
ideas not of our choosing. Our freedom of expressive association allows us to 
claim an idea as our own, and to say “that idea is not mine . . . and you may not 
say it in my name.” In this Article, I have shown that this “not in my name” 
conception of constitutional right has iterations in several areas of First 
Amendment law. The right against compelled speech prevents the state from 
forcing us to utter or host/display expression not of our choosing. The right 
against compelled subsidies for speech prevents the state from forcing us to pay 
for expression not of our choosing. Because with tax dollars the state speaks in 
the name of the citizens, however, state speech is an exception to the rule against 
compelled subsidies for expression. The right of expressive association itself has 
grounded important dicta preventing the state from forcing us to admit as 
members those whose views are antithetical to groups we have formed to 
advance specific ideas, and it has produced one holding striking down state 
action of this sort.288 Finally, the right against government establishment of 
religion prevents the state from expressing support for the truth claims of a 
specific religion or religions. Such state religious speech purports to be in all of 
our names, but this is something the state may not do; it may not connect us as 
 
286 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681-82 (2005). 
287 Id. 
288 All three of these rights—against compelled speech, subsidies, and association—are 
presumptive, subject to override by sufficiently compelling state interests. See supra text 
accompanying notes 83-85, 124-55, 172-76. 
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citizens (or taxpayers, if tax dollars are involved) with sectarian claims of 
religious truth. Thus, state religious expression is an exception to the state speech 
exception to the right against compelled subsidies for speech—although usually 
state speech is properly in all of our names, state religious speech is not. 
Understanding this common thread of the freedom of expressive association 
running through various parts of First Amendment doctrine and theory permits 
us to resolve cases in which a reasonable person would misattribute state speech 
to a private party or a private party’s speech to the state. In the former, the state 
creates a false connection between message and person, which is a harm to the 
person that goes beyond the harm from an infringement of the freedom of 
expressive association in a setting without misattribution. The infringement 
without misattribution involves using me or my property or my funds to help 
advance an idea not my own. Misattributing state speech to me does this too, but 
in addition creates a false picture or impression of which ideas I endorse. The 
second type of misattribution—mistaking a private party’s expression for the 
state’s—can result in the same type of Establishment Clause harm as when the 
state is in fact speaking—both constitute a type of infringement of the freedom 
of expressive association. When the state provides a platform for private 
religious expression in a way that would cause a reasonable viewer to mistakenly 
think the expression is the state’s, citizens may once again say that such speech 
may not be made in their name. 
 
